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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONTRACTS
Memb'e

By PAUL F. GOLDSMITH
of the Denver firm of Sears & Goldsmith, and Instructor
in Law, University of Denver College of Law

The cases being considered in this review are grouped into
various broad subdivisions. Perhaps the most important case is one
dealing -with the interpretation of what was intended to be a covenant not to sue.' Failure to know of it could be disastrous to the
practitioner of the law.
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE

,In Nucla Sanitation Dist. v. Rippy, 2 the district sued to recover
damages for an alleged breach of contract. Rippy counterclaimed
for work done and expenses incurred in reliance on the district's
representation that it had accepted a counter-offer made by Rippy.
The facts of the case were as follows: the district prepared a written contract and mailed it to Rippy. Rippy signed and returned the
contract, but sent a covering letter stating that his acceptance was
conditioned on extension of the proposed completion date. Rippy
moved in his construction equipment after speaking to the president of the district and having been assured that everything was
all right regarding the contract and the conditional letter of acceptance. The district, in the meantime, had written to Rippy refusing to extend the completion date. Rippy pulled off the job
when he received the district's letter. The Court held that Ripp's
conditional acceptance of the district's offer amounted to a counteroffer which was never accepted by the district. No contract resulted. An approved instruction stated, in essence, that an acceptance
must be in the identical terms of the offer, without any modification whatever, otherwise it is only a counter-proposition.
In Superior Distrib. Corp. v. Points,3 the plaintiff recovered
the money he had paid to the defendant under a purchase order.
After receiving the purchase order and the deposit money, Superior
required Points to sign a note and conditional sales contract, on
terms different from those in the purchase order, and refused to deliver the purchased merchandise unless these additional documents
were executed. Judgment for the purchaser was affirmed in a holding that Superior could not claim the benefits of the original contract while denying its obligations under that contract and demanding a new agreement. The Nucla Sanitation case is cited along with
two other cases which hold that an acceptance on terms varying
from those offered is a rejection of offer.
CONSIDERATION

In Arrow Mfg. Co. v. Ross, 4 employees and employer had discussed the possibility of an increase in pay. After the end of the
employer's fiscal year, the employer sought permission of the Wage
I Price v. Baker, 12 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 157 (1959). At the time of this writing a petition
for re-hearing has not been determined. This case is discussed in the text at footnote 26 infra.
2 344 P.2d 976 (Colo. 1959).
3 347 P.2d 140 (Colo. 1959).
4 346 P.2d 305 (Colo. 1959).
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Stabilization Board to pay a retroactive bonus for the preceding
fiscal year. Between the end of that year and the receipt of approval from the Board, some of the employees were discharged for
lack of work. The court held that the discharged employees were
not entitled to participate in this gratuitous bonus since the employees gave no consideration upon which it could be contended
they had an agreement with their employer for the payment to
them of a share of the authorized bonus. Continued employment
could not be said to have been induced by the expectation of a
bonus since the employees knew nothing of it.
Schweizer v. Amalgamated Butcher Workmen 5 is here included for the limited purpose of illustrating an accord and satisfaction
between the plaintiff and the defendant concerning the plaintiff's
claims for vacation and sick pay. After discharge, the plaintiff and
her employer met and agreed on the sum of $100.45 for these items
and a check for this amount was given to her. The plaintiff did not
cash this check. The mutual agreements regarding vacation and
sick pay, by way of compromise, were consideration for each party
giving up additional rights then asserted. Having compromised the
disputed claims, an accord and satisfaction arose.
In Police Pension and Relief Board v. McPhail,6 the view was
approved that the pension claimed by policemen had the attributes
of a contract and was entitled to constitutional protection. 7 The
plaintiffs' employment was under a written contract on terms set
forth in the charter and an ordinance of the City and County of
Denver8 providing that plaintiffs would receive a pension subject
to increase or decrease based on the salary of the rank which they
occupied as of date of retirement. One factor which weighed heavily in favor of the policemen was that they had contributed to the
pension fund through the years. The court recognizes that the contract principle regarding the pension escalation clause here adopted
is a minority view, but is supported by consideration paid by the
policemen, which consisted of regular contributions paid out of the
policemen's taxable income.
CONDITIONS

Two fire insurance policies were construed in Standard Marine
Ins. Co. v. PeckY One policy contained a condition suspending the
insurance coverage at such times as there might be an increased
hazard within the control and knowledge of the insured; the other
policy denied coverage for loss or damage arising from illegal trade.
The plaintiff's losses arose out of a fire caused by ignition of fireworks. The court found that fireworks were held for sale contrary
to an applicable statute. This increased hazard being in the control
or knowledge of the insured, and the fireworks trade being illegal,
the trial court's judgments for plaintiff were reversed.
Where a party to a contract in effect promises to procure the
occurrence of a condition, and does not make a bona fide effort to
secure such occurrence, recovery of monies dependent upon the
5
6
7
8
9

347 P.2d 516 (Colo. 1959).
338 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1959).
Colo. Const., art. II, § 11.
Denver, Colo., Charter § 133, at 45.46 (1953).
342 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1959).
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non-existence of the condition will be denied. Accordingly, in Maruca v. Hunter & Presba,Inc.,10 a judgment refusing to return plaintiff's deposit on purchase of a tavern was affirmed, even though a
stated condition never occurred, because plaintiff had not made a
bona fide effort to secure a loan. This loan was a condition in a receipt and option on the non-occurrence of which the vendor was to
return purchaser's deposit.
In Jahn v. Park Hill Realty Co.,11 the broker secured judgment
against the defendant owners for his commission under a listing
agreement which gave the broker an exclusive right to sell. The
owners gave possession during the period of an extension of the
listing, which extension the court found to have been ratified by
the co-owner who had not joined in the extension agreement. The
deed was withheld until after the extended listing had expired.
Testimony supported the position that the sale was closed when the
purchasers moved in, which was prior to termination of the extended listing. The condition under the listing of a sale "either by the
undersigned owner, the undersigned broker, or by any person... "12
occurred when the owners sold during the listing period, and the
broker's right to commission
was immediately perfected.
14
An earlier decision 13 was re-affirmed in Hayutin v. DeAndrea
to the effect that a broker who does not have an exclusive right to
sell cannot collect a commission on a sale which is consummated to
a person not produced by the broker. In order for the broker to
collect, it is not necessary that his efforts be the sole cause of the
sale; however, they must be the predominating effective cause of
the sale. In Hayutin, the owner called in the broker after the purchaser had first contacted the owner.
Conditions relating to cancellation of contracts were considered
in City of Fort Collins v. Park View Pipe Line.15 In this case the
city reserved the right to cancel outside-water-users' contracts "at
any time upon giving written notice of intent so to do" in one group
of contracts, and in another contract the cancellation clause provided for cancellation "when, in the judgment of the City Council, the
interests of the City of Fort Collins require the discontinuance of
such service in order to better serve the inhabitants of the City of
10 344 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1959).
11 12 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 223 (1959).
12 Ibid.

13 Heady v. Tomlinson, 134 Colo. 33, 299 P.2d 120 (1956).
14 337 P.2d 383 (Colo. 1959).
15 336 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1959).
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Fort Collins." Water users having contracts with the first type of
cancellation clause could not object to cancellation on notice. The
second type of cancellation clause was held to state a condition
which the city council must first find to exist. This provision for
termination, like a "just cause" or "good cause" required a finding
of fact based upon a fair and honest cause regulated by good faith
on the part of the party exercising the power to terminate.
MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED

Two cases arose under this general subject. The first, Crouch
v. Mountain States Feed Co.,' 7 holds that where a plaintiff seeks to
recover upon a quasi-contractual theory of money had and received,
having elected to waive the tort which gave rise to the implied contract to pay the money, he must show that the defendant actually
received the money claimed. Judgment for plaintiff in this action
was reversed and a new trial ordered because such receipt had not
been proved.
In the other case, American Medical and Dental Ass'n v.
Brown,18 Brown paid the association the amount it claimed on an
assigned claim in order to secure a release of garnishment. Brown
later found a receipt evidencing previous payment of the assigned
claim to the assignor. The court approved a judgment, in favor of
Brown, on the theory of money had and received by the association through coercion by the garnishment proceedings. In equity
and good conscience the money should be returned to Brown since
payment to the association represented a duplication.
AcCOUNT STATED

The case of Johnson v. Adams19 once again sets forth the elements 20 necessary to prove an account stated. In this case the court
denied the existence of an account stated. A finding of the trial
court that there was a dispute as to part of the claim was approved.
The mere sending of a bill, and a failure of the recipient to object
thereto, was not sufficient to establish an account stated.
MECHANIC'S LIEN CASES

Sontag v. Abbott 2 l emphasizes the danger of permitting the

holder of an option to purchase real estate, to take any steps toward
the commencement of a building prior to recordation of the purchase money encumbrance. Sontag lent the optionee the purchase
money, and received a note and deed of trust to secure it. Two days
before Sontag received and recorded the trust deed, the optionee
ordered material from Abbott, which was immediately delivered to
the premises. The materials were incorporated in a structure built
by the optionee. All of the building operation took place after the
16
17
1
19
20

Id. at 720.
343 P.2d 1052 (Colo. 1959).
344 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1959).
337 P.2d 601 (Colo. 1959).
The court stated that the elements of account stated are epitomized as follows:
1. An account which must have been examined and accepted by the parties;
2. An agreement that the balance and all items of account representing the previous monetary
transactions of the perties are correct;
3. An admission of liability to the apparent debtor for the amount of the balance against him.
4. The assent of both parties and a meeting of the minds.
Id. at 603.
21 344 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1959).
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option ripened into a fee title. Sontag foreclosed his deed of trust
and received a trustee's deed. Thereafter, Abbott sued to foreclose
his mechanic's lien. The trial court's holding was affirmed to the
effect that the optionee held an interest in land by virtue of his option. When this interest later ripened into a fee title, the date of delivery of materials would be treated under the statute as "commencement of the work" 22 for purposes of establishing priority of
liens between Sontag and the materialmen. The materialmen won
out over the mortgagee.
The other mechanic's lien case, Hayutin v. Gibbons,23 holds that
a materialman may have a valid action for debt, for the full amount
of goods delivered to the project, even though his lien may be for
less than the contract price of the goods. Johnson was Hayutin's
building contractor. The contract between Hayutin and Johnson
was filed pursuant to statute. On disputed facts, the trial court
found that Hayutin had ratified Johnson's contract with the materialman by expressly promising payment for such materials.
Through the ratification the unauthorized act of Johnson bound
EHayutin, in spite of the limitation clause in the statute. 24 Hayutin's
personal liability thus exceeded the amount of the lien.
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS

Some cases, discussed under other headings, could be discussed
here. In Hutchinson v. Elder,25 there is a holding that inept expressions should not be allowed to defeat the evident intention of the
contract. It is further held that an interpretation making the contract fair and reasonable is to be preferred to one which would be
harsh and unreasonable. The case involves a contract between the
landowner and a building contractor which contemplated a joint
venture to develop a residential area. Construction loan costs were
held to be the sole obligation of the landowner and not included in
the term "ultimate cost of the houses". A provision for payment of
fifty per cent of "any amount obtained from.the sale of any house
as additional compensation to the contractor was held to require deduction of usual sale and closing expenses and to be the
equivalent of an agreement to divide the net amount obtained on
the sale. Mr. Justice Moore dissented, stating that the majority
opinion makes a new contract by writing in the word "net". While
dissenting opinions do not satisfy litigants, they often, as here, enable the reader to gain a clearer concept of the problem involved.
The "booby trap" case referred to in the introductory paragraph is Price v. Baker.2 6 Here the plaintiffs gave a so-called covenant not to sue to one of three defendants, after plaintiffs' action
for damages for fraud and deceit was set for trial. The covenant
stated that plaintiffs ".

.

. expressly reserves (sic) the right to sue

and continue to sue any other person or persons against whom they
may have or assert any claim for loss or damage .... ,27The cov22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 86-3.3 (1953).
23 338 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1959).
24 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 86-3-1, .2 (1953).

The filing of a contract which conformed to the require-

ments of these sections of Mechanic Lien Statutes has sometimes

proven to be the most effective way

that the owner can limit his liability to mechanics, materialmen and subcontractors. It would have
served Hayutin's purpose here except for his ratification of the unauthorized contract.
25 344 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1959).
26 12 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 157 (1959).
27 Id. at 158.
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enant further provided that it might be pleaded as a defense in bar
or abatement of any action against the covenantee. The covenantee

was, by stipulation, dismissed without prejudice. The other two defendants then moved for summary judgment of dismissal for them
as well, alleging that the covenant was a release since it could be
pled as a bar, and that a release of one joint tortfeasor was a release of all. In a four to three decision, the covenant was held to be
equivalent to a release of the one joint tortfeasor thereby releasing
the others. It is difficult to reconcile the kindly language in Hutchison v. Elder28 with the harsh result in Price, a result which appears
to be exactly contrary to the expressed intent of the covenant in
Price. An excellent dissent by Mr. Justice Doyle, with Justices Day
and Frantz concurring, must be studied by every practitioner. The
better view, in the opinion of this reviewer, would be to overrule
Morris v. Diers29 which supports the majority opinion and follow
those cases cited in the dissent which hold that a release which contains a reservation of right against remaining defendants should be
construed as a covenant not to sue.
In Ryan v. Fitzpatrick Drilling Co.,30 the plaintiff contractor
agreed to drill an oil well in Wyoming to a depth sufficient to test
the Curtis sands or to a total depth of 4300 feet. The contract also
provided that any drilling costs, after the necessary Schlumberger
electric log had been run, was to be borne twenty-five per cent by
the contractor, seventy-five per cent by the defendant operator. The
Curtis sand was encountered at 4775 feet. The plaintiff sought to
recover three-quarters of the cost of alleged extras representing
drilling costs between 4300 and 4775 feet. The judgment of the trial
court awarding the plaintiff three-quarters of the cost of claimed
extras was affirmed. The defendant claimed that the test clause
modified the depth clause and that no extras could be claimed until
the test had been run. Approval was given to the trial court's finding that plaintiff was required to drill only to a depth to test the
Curtis sand or to a total depth of 4300 feet whichever was reached
first. Additional drilling was therefore to be compensated on a
quantum meruit basis and evidence of a trade custom was admitted
to establish the value of such extras.
In Greeley & Loveland Irrigation Co. v. McCloughan, 1 plaintiff's predecessor had a right to 140 inches of water from defendant.
For a period of forty-five years such predecessor, and later plaintiff,
had accepted only 100 inches. In reversing the trial court's decree
quieting title in plaintiff to the claimed additional water, the court
held that the construction placed on a contract by the parties, before controversy arose, was a reliable test of their own interpretation of the contract. It was held that the long continued distribution of water in a manner wholly inconsistent with the contract on
which plaintiffs relied, along with other evidence, defeated plaintiff's claim.
28 344
29, 134
30 342
31 342

P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1959).
Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956).
P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1959).
P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1959).
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ESTOPPEL AND RATIFICATION

In Western Motor Rebuilders, Inc. v. Carlson,3" the plaintiff
bought land from Carlson, and fully paid for it. Thereafter, with
Carlson's full knowledge, plaintiff entered into possession and constructed a motel, costing approximately $45,000, on the land. Five
months after payment and plaintiff's entry, Carlson recorded restrictive covenants and thereafter delivered the deed to the plaintiff. In reversing a decree of the trial court enjoining the purchaser
from operating any business enterprise on the land in violation of

the restrictive covenants, the court pointed to the actions of the parties before the controversy as being one of the best indications of
their true intent. Viewed in this light there was no contractual prohibition against a business use of the land. Plaintiff-seller testified
that while defendant was
building the motel, she just sat by and
"said nothing. I listened."3 3 Such conduct, the court stated, estopped
the plaintiff to assert any breach of the restrictive conditions later
recorded. Query: Can the same past-contractual event (silence)
form the basis of contract interpretation, and of estoppel?
In Ashback v. Wenzel, 34 a judgment of dismissal was affirmed.
The plaintiff sought to obtain damages for an alleged breach of
contract, which breach was found not to exist, and plaintiff sought
to accelerate maturity under the promissory notes by reason of the
payor's failure to pay on time. The evidence disclosed that for
thirty-one months the payee had accepted late payments. Such
long-continued acceptance of late payments was held to waive the
defaults so far as time of payment was concerned and to prevent
the payee from declaring the entire unpaid balance due and payable
without prior warning. In Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Selected Pictures, Inc., 35 so far as pertinent to this review, it is held that retention of proceeds of a contract may constitute ratification of the
contract.
RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION OF CONTRACT

Rescission of purchase of stock in a mining company was per-

mitted in O.K. Uranium Development Co. v. Miller.36 Here representations had been made that the company had valuable properties, sufficient funds to carry on exploration for at least six months

without further financing, was in good financial condition, and that
ore samples exhibited were from the company's properties. In fact,
the company only had properties under option in the name of one
of its chief officers. Miller testified that he believed the representations, and that had he known them to be false he would not have
invested his money. A judgment of rescission for fraud in the inducement to plaintiff to purchase the stock was affirmed. It is interesting to note that the type of option right claimed by the company in this case was the same as in Sontag v. Abbott.37 This indi-

cates that the same type of right may change its character with its
context; the optionee there had sufficient right to create mechanic's
32 138 Colo. 404, 335 P.2d 272 (1959).
33 Id. at 417, 335 P.2d at 279.
34 346 P.2d 295 (Colo. 1959).
35 138 Colo. 468, 335 P.2d 260 (1959).
:16 345 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1959).
37 344 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1959); 344 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1959), discussed in text at note 21 supra.
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liens, but he does not here have "property" to make his representations to Miller true.
In Olinger Mutual Benefit Ass'n v. Christy,38 the insurer sought
to avoid a life insurance policy on the basis of misrepresentations
made in the application for coverage. The court holds that an insurance contract is not sui generis. In order to avoid such, or any
other contract, the quantum of proof must, according to the court,
be clear, convincing, indubitable, and beyond a reasonable doubt.
The same quantum is said to be required to avoid a contract for
fraud, concealment or mistake. Mr. Justice Moore filed a written
case should be compared with40 language in
dissent. The principal
Woodruff v. Clarke39 and Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp.
In Askins v. Easterling,1 an oral contract between the plaintiff
and his deceased wife was examined. The wife had made the down
payment on real property which was to have been purchased in the
names of both the husband and wife. The plaintiff made succeeding payments on the property, in part from rentals on the property.
After the decedent's death, it was discovered that she had taken the
property in her sole name and had later conveyed the property to
herself and her son by a prior marriage as joint tenants. The court
held that the son took an undivided one-half interest in the property
as constructive trustee for the plaintiff-husband.

The court ap-

38 342 P.2d 1000 (Colo. 1959).
39 128 Colo. 387, 262 P.2d 737 (1953).
40 114 Colo. 578, 168 P.2d 256 (1946). In this case there was a holding that fraud may be inferred
from inadequacy of consideration. It may be difficult to reconcile such inference with the requirement
that a misrepresentation must be "indubitable".
41 347 P.2d 126 (Colo. 1959).
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proved a finding that the oral contract had been breached by the
wife, but also stated that such a contract must be established by
clear and convincing evidence.
ATTORNEYS FEES, INTEREST AND DAMAGES

In Rock Wool Insulating Co. v. Huston4 2 the court said that attorney's fees which were not shown to have been actually incurred
or paid by plaintiff-payee could not be secured in an action on a
promissory note providing for such fees. The lower court's judgment for such fees, being unsupported by any evidence, was reversed.
In Stone v. Currigan4 3 the Colorado Interest Statute 44 was con-

strued as requiring interest to be paid to a judgment creditor whose
judgment was entered January 13, 1958, nunc pro tunc, as of the
earlier date, February 16, 1956. This case is included here because
of the following dictum: "By way of carefully considered dictum,
let it be known that any creditor who can bring himself within the
terms of the quoted statute is entitled to interest from his debtor, '4"
even though the original judgment may have omitted the adjudication of interest.
In an action for damages for a landlord's refusal to grant a
lease pursuant to contract, 46 a judgment for plaintiff was reduced
by eliminating expected profits from a business to be operated at
the intended situs of the leased premises. The loss of such profits
was characterized as being purely conjectural, based upon complete
realization of the lessee's most ambitious hopes and dreams for the
new future. The court stated that "litigants cannot be permitted to
estimate the money out of the coffers of their opponents in this
reckless way..

..

-41

Interest was allowed on the statutory penalty bond 48 of a motor
vehicle dealer in Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co. v. State.49 The
cause of action arose in October 1947. The interest was allowed
from date of commencement of the action, June 16, 1948.
MISCELLANEOUS

CASES

The case of Colorado Mortgage Co. v. Nolan" is a follow-up
stating the same law as in the original case between the parties.5 1
University of Denver v. Industrial Comm'n 52 holds, insofar as
pertinent to this review, that parties cannot by private contract
abrogate statutory requirements or conditions affecting the public
policy of the state. Consequently, a receipt in full payment for
commuted installments due under the Workmen's Compensation

Act 53 does not prevent the employee from re-opening the case with-

in the statutory period.
42 346 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1959).
43 334 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1959).
44 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 73-1-2 (1953).
45 334 P.2d at 743.
46 Nevin v. Bates, 347 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1959).
47 Id.

at 778.

48 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-11-9 (1953).
49 347 P.2d 507 (Colo. 1959).
50 347 P.2d 778 (Colo. 1959).
51 Nolan v. Colorado Mortgage Co., 137 Colo. 103, 322 P.2d 98 (1958), 36 DICTA 22 (1959).
52 138 Colo. 505, 335 P.2d 292 (1959).
53 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 81-14-19 (1953).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CORPORATIONS,
PARTNERSHIP AND AGENCY
By ERNEST W. LOHF
Partnerin the Denver firm of Keller, Bloomenthal and Lohf
Probably slightly more than the usual number of cases involving questions of corporation, partnership or agency law were decided in 1959. None of the cases can be considered, however, to be of
crucial importance in the development of Colorado law in these
areas. In one case presenting particularly acute problems of proper
analysis and the application of established legal concepts, the Supreme Court was very sharply divided, so that generalization as to
the value of the case as a precedent is difficult.
A. CORPORATIONS
1) Authority of Officers of Closely Held Corporations
One of the first cases decided by the Colorado Supreme Court
held that the president of a corporation had authority to convene
the board of directors to present for its consideration a demand by
a corporate creditor.' The court thereafter rarely addressed itself
specifically to authority of corporate officers until 1959, when three
cases raising issues as to the authority of a corporate president were
decided, all in favor of existence of the authority questioned, including authority to discharge a corporate debt, to borrow on corporate credit and to execute a contract on behalf of the corporation.
The decisions have a double-edged significance: attorneys having
misgivings regarding actions taken by the principal officer of their
closely held corporate clients without strict observance of customary formalities may find comfort in the extent to which the court
has upheld relatively loose, informal methods of corporate action;
in other contexts, however, the extent to which the principal officer
apparently is authorized to bind his corporation may give cause for
.alarm.
Colorado Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Beery2 involved
a Colorado fire insurance company of which Schwab was president, treasurer and chief executive officer. His wife was vice
president and secretary, and she and her husband were the company's sole directors and stockholders. Schwab deposited $10,000
of the company's funds with the Association, receiving a transferable, non-negotiable certificate of indebtedness stating that the
company was a member of the Association and owner of a $10,000
investment-share account therein subject to its charter and by-laws.
The Association's signature card executed at the time of the deposit
did not bear the signature of the company but merely that of "Larry Schwab." Subsequently Schwab appeared at the Association's
office, surrendered the certificate, indorsing it "Larry Schwab, Pr.,"
and received the Association's check in the amount of the deposit,
payable to Schwab personally. Under the Association's rules, the
certificate could be surrendered for cash by the owner or holder
1 Union Gold Mining Co. v. Rocky Mountain Not'I Bank, 1 Colo. 531 (1872).
2

347 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1959).

12
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upon indorsement corresponding with the signature card. It was
assumed at trial that Schwab converted the proceeds to his own use.
A receiver subsequently appointed for the company sued the Association to recover the amount of the deposit and recovered judgment in the trial court.
The Supreme Court reversed with directions to dismiss the
complaint. The majority opinion by Mr. Justice Doyle stated: "Even
though there was no formal resolution of the Board of Directors, in
view of Schwab's ownership and control of the stock and his control of all of the offices, it would seem he had actual authority to
surrender the certificate and receive the money. '3 Further, "Schwab
also had apparent authority to receive payment. He had created
the account, had signed the signature card in blank and 4 he had
possession of and surrendered the indicium of ownership.
Justices Hall and Frantz dissented as to the effect of and inferences to be drawn from the evidence, being unable to agree that
all of the facts upon which the majority opinion was predicated appeared in the record.5
In Rock Wool Insulating Co. v. Huston6 the defendant corporation, of which Reilly was president and general manager,
was essentially "a one man operation" and operated in a "loose, informal and unbusinesslike way."7 The plaintiff loaned $5,000 to the
corporation at the request of Reilly and other officers who represented that the money was to be used to pay corporate expenses, receiving in exchange a promissory note in the amount of $6,000 evidencing not only the $5,000 loan but also a prior $1,000 personal loan
to Reilly. The note was executed by Reilly as president of the corporation and also individually. Proceeds of the loan were deposited
in Reilly's personal bank account, and Reilly by his personal checks
paid expenses of the corporation in an amount exceeding $5,000.
Testimony was conflicting as to whether the transaction was reported to the board of directors, which usually had approved Reilly's prior transactions, including numerous borrowings. The corporation's secretary-treasurer was familiar with the subject transaction, but the corporate books did not reflect it. The books did
show, however, a $5,000 indebtedness to Reilly. In this action on
the note, the corporation contended the transaction was a personal
loan. In affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court
stated that there was evidence in the record to support the plaintiff's claim and refused to hold as a matter of law that the loan was
a personal one.
Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Selected Pictures, Inc.' raised questions not only as to authority of officers but also as to validity of
intercorporate contracts involving common controlling persons. Selected had three directors, who were also its sole stockholders. One
of them, Bailey, was its president and chief managing officer. Under Bailey's supervision, Selected's office manager customarily
3 Id. at 149.
4 Id. at 150.
5 The dissenters questioned whether authority to make deposits implied asuthority to make with.
drawals; whether Schwab and his wife in fact were the only shareholders; whether Schwab and his
wife in fact were the only directors; whether Schwab was the only person actively managing the
corporation; and generally attacked inferences by the majority as to Schwab's authority.
6 346 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1959).
7 Id. at 578.
8 335 P.2d 260 (Colo. 1959).
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executed all corporate checks and contracts, having express authority from Bailey to do so. Bailey was also authorized to execute contracts on behalf of Selected. The other two directors, in effect, were
silent partners with whom Bailey did not want to be publicly associated.
Film was a corporation organized by George, using $3,000 advanced for that purpose by Bailey, in order to distribute a motion
picture film. It was understood that Bailey was to receive a fifty
per cent stock interest in Film upon the occurrence of certain contingencies. Only three qualifying shares were ever issued in Film.
Selected contracted to rent the motion picture from Film, Bailey and another director of Selected having previously seen the picture exhibited. The contract was executed by George on behalf of
Film and on behalf of Selected by Bailey, who signed the name of
the office manager thereto without disclosing to him either the
terms of the contract or its execution. The other two directors of
Selected also were unaware of execution of the contract, and Selected's files contained no record thereof. Selected did, however,
-distribute the film and retained the proceeds without remitting
rentals to Film.
In a suit by Film to enforce the contract, the Supreme Court
reversed a judgment for Selected in the trial court, holding that,
under the circumstances, Bailey had implied power to execute the
contract in the name of Selected, using the office manager's name
even without his knowledge; that so doing did not constitute a forgery; and that Bailey had no duty to report execution of the contract to the other directors.
2) IntercorporateContracts Involving Common or
Interested Controlling Persons
The trial court in the Selected Pictures case concluded that, in
view of Bailey's financial interest in Film and his non-disclosure of
his actions, conduct and interest to the other Selected directors, his
actions could not be sustained in a suit to enforce the contract. On
appeal it was urged that the contract was "void" because Bailey was
a dominant member of both corporations, so that an arm's-length
transaction was impossible. The court did not agree that the contract was void, but stated: "This is the type of situation which calls
for a close judicial scrutiny to determine the absence or presence
of fraud and unfairness and could result in a voidable contract."9
The court noted that no adequate evidence appeared in the record
showing the contract to be either fair or unfair and disposed of the
,contention as follows: "In law the deliberate withholding by Selected of payments acknowledged to be due Film resulted in an adequate ratification of this contract to bind Selected regardless of the
fairness or unfairness of the contract and of Bailey's controversial
role in its execution."' 10
This aspect of the case, therefore, adopts the rule that a dual
position of corporate directors and officers in intercorporate con9 Id. at 264.
10 Id. at 265.
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tracts does not alone make such contracts void, 1 but that such contracts, even if unfair and thereby voidable, are nonetheless subject
to ratification. The more difficult question, whether existence of an
interest adverse to the corporation is so material a fact that its nondisclosure should make the 2contract voidable, even if fair in its
terms, remains to be decided.'
3) Failureto File Annual Report
Prior to effectiveness (January 1, 1959) of the Colorado Corporation Act of 1958,'13 executive officers and directors of a corporation failing to file the prescribed annual report were subject to
joint and several liability for the portion of the corporation's debts
contracted in the calendar year preceding the due date of the report, except that liability could not be imposed on an individual officer or director in excess of $1,000 nor "for any debt contracted
while he was not a director."'1 4 The provision was amended in 1955
to prohibit suits thereunder "after" the date of filing of a delinquent
report for the year in which the debt sued on was contracted. 1 5 No
corresponding liability provisions appear in the 1958 legislation 1 6 or
the 1959 amendments thereto. 17
The liability of directors under the pre-1958 provisions summarized above was the subject of two cases decided in 1959. Carpenter Paper Co. v. Noble" established that resignation of a director
at any time during the calendar year preceding default in the filing
of the report relieved such director from the statutory liability and
that, on the other hand, the filing of a bankruptcy petition by the
corporation prior to the default did not relieve a director still in office from the liability. The defendants in Nichols v. Garrott19 relied
on the 1955 amendment, which was enacted three days after the default complained of, and on their having filed a delinquent report
on the same day on which the action against them was commenced.
The Supreme Court affirmed judgment for the plaintiff.
4) Access of Foreign Corporationsto Colorado Courts
In Aero Spray, Inc. v. Ace Flying Service, Inc.,20 foreign corporation A, alleging a claim against foreign corporation B for goods
sold and delivered in Oregon, proceeded in attachment and garnishment against a debt owing B from the State of Colorado. Neither A
nor B had qualified to do business as a foreign corporation in Colorado. B was served by publication. The Supreme Court, reversing
dismissal of the complaint, held that A could maintain the attachment proceeding. Unfortunately the opinion does not make clear,
however, whether or not A in fact had engaged in business in Colorado prior to the suit. If so, A presumably would have lacked
11 Accord, Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942). The decision appears in large
measure to overrule sub silentio the doctrines of Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. 539, 79 Pac. 416 (1900)
(sale of mining stock, though free from fraud, by corporation to its directors set aside where five of
eleven directors were interested) and Paxton v. Herron, 41 Colo. 147, 92 Pac. 15 (1907) (interested
director cannot be counted for quorum).
12 See Ballantine, Corporations 178 (Rev. ed. 1946).
13 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 32.
14 Colo. Sess. Laws 1931, at 260-61.
15 Colo. Sess. Laws 1955, at 236.
16 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 32.
17 Cola. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 83.
1 345 P.2d 731 (Cola. 1959).
19 338 P.2d 683 (Colo. 1959).
20 338 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1959).
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standing to sue on account of its non-qualification. '

B. PARTNERSHIP
None of the 1959 Colorado cases arose under either the Colorado Uniform Partnership Law 22 or the Colorado Uniform Limited
Partnership Law.2 3 In Hutchinson v. Elder,2 4 a series of contracts
contemplating development of building sites was interpreted as having created a joint venture, but the case is not otherwise remarkable from the standpoint of the law of partnerships and joint ventures.
C. AGENCY
1) Existence and Duration of Principal-AgentRelation
Cox v. Metropolitan State Bank, Inc.25 is placed under this heading with misgivings. The case is remarkable not so much for the
law established thereby or its value as a precedent, as for the fact
situation presented, which can be, and was, analyzed in terms of a
number of customary legal concepts and categories, including those
of principal-agent, trustee-beneficiary, creditor-debtor, of the law of
sales and the law merchant. Judging from the experience of the
Supreme Court justices in dealing with the case, it should provide
raw material par excellence for bar examiners and law professors.
The facts were as follows:
Rust was a dealer in grain and motor vehicles, sometimes acting as agent of the owner in selling vehicles, sometimes buying for
resale as principal and sometimes acting on a commission basis. He
had conducted his 'banking business at the defendant bank for several years, which was generally familiar with his operations. He
owed the bank approximately $8,000, long past due, which the bank
had been attempting without success to collect.
Rust agreed to attempt to sell a truck belonging to Cox with the
understanding that Rust could retain the excess of the sales price
over $5,000. Rust thereafter attempted unsuccessfully to sell the
truck to several prospective purchasers under arrangements which
were attempted to be financed through the bank. On December 15,
1954, Rust did, however, obtain a purchaser at a price of $6,120.
21 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 83, § 119 [1], at 341 provides: "No foreign corporation transacting
business in this state without a certificate of authority nor anyone in its behalf shall be permitted to
maintain any action, suit or proceeding in any court of this state, until such corporation shall have
obtained a certificate of authority."
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 104, art. 1 (1953).
23 Cola. Rev. Stat. ch. 104, art. 2 (1953).

24 34A P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1959).
25 138 Colo. 576, 336 P.2d 742 (1959).
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On December 18, at the request of Cox, Rust issued his personal
check for $1,000 to Cox on account of his interest in the sales
price. On December 20 Rust received a $6,120 uncertified check
from the purchaser drawn on a bank in Utah. On the same day
Cox delivered to Rust an assignment of title to the truck executed
in blank, and Rust issued to Cox additional checks drawn on the
bank in amounts of $3,500 and $500. Rust later inserted his name
as assignee of title to the truck but testified, apparently without
contradiction, that the title certificate would have been handled
the same way whether Rust acted as principal or on a commission
basis.
Rust consulted officials of the bank in a private office for ten to
thirty minutes prior to depositing the $6,120 check to his general
account at the bank on December 20. The bank's ledger card concerning Rust's indebtedness was on the table throughout the consultation. At least one purpose of the consultation was to expedite
clearance of the $6,120 check; the balance in Rust's account was
insufficient to pay all the Cox checks without credit for the $6,120
deposit. The bank advised Rust to secure a telegram from the Utah
bank accepting the $6,120 charge, which was done; and Rust's account was credited with the deposit on the same day. The deposit
slip stated all deposits were accepted for collection only; that credit
was given only conditionally; and that the bank reserved the right
to charge back to the depositor all unpaid items. The bank did,
however, on December 20, cash the $500 check given to Cox, for
which sufficient funds were on deposit in Rust's account prior to
deposit of the $6,120 check.
Rust testified that, during the foregoing consultation, he also
had informed the bank concerning the Cox transaction and that
the bank had promied, prior to the $6,120 deposit, not to seize
the deposited funds for application to Rust's indebtedness to the
bank. The bank officials, however, denied knowledge of the Cox
transaction and the making of such a promise.
Also on December 20, the bank's prior efforts to collect its debt
owing from Rust resulted, late in the day, in his delivering to the
bank, in satisfaction of the debt, a deed to certain real estate warranting title to be free and clear except for first deed of trust of
which the bank admitted knowledge. 26 In fact a second deed of
trust was of record at the time the deed was executed, which was
not discovered by the bank until December 21.27 The bank immediately rescinded its release of Rust from his debt and seized the entire balance on.deposit in his account. The remaining checks, totalling $4,500, subsequently were dishonored.
Cox then sued the bank and Rust for $4,500, claiming that
the $6,120 deposit was a special one as the bank knew or had reason to know. The trial court entered judgment for Cox on the
ground that a valid accord and satisfaction had occurred with respect to Rust's debt to the bank and that the bank could not rescind
26 There is perhaps some confusion as to the exact time of delivery of the deed. In the first appeal,
Metropolitan State Bank v. Cox, 134 Colo. 260, 302 P.2d 188 (1956), the opinion states that the deed
was delivered to the bank "before the sale of the tractor by Rust and the receipt by him of $6,120
from the purchaser . . ." (Id. at 263, 302 P.2d at 190.) In the some opinion, the Court quotes a trial
court finding that Rust " 'delivered the deed to Mr. Fosh, an agent of the bank, at his home about
midnight December 20, 1954.' " (Id. at 266, 302 P.2d at 191.)
27 The bank's lack of knowledge of the second deed of trust was not found by the trial court at
the time of the first appeal (see note 26 supra).
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its release, cancel the deed and revest title in Rust except through
appropriate legal proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the bank had the right, assuming its acceptance of the deed had
been induced fraudulently, to treat its discharge of Rust's debt as a
nullity, and remanded for further findings on the question of
fraud. 28 Upon the remand, the trial court gave judgment for the
bank. On appeal from that judgment, the Supreme Court in the
instant case again reversed with directions to enter judgment for
Cox.
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Moore, states that
the trial court finding that the $6,120 deposit was not received as
a special deposit "is tantamount to a finding that the bank had no
notice of the trust nature of the transaction between Rust and
Cox";29 and that the trial court's finding that the funds seized by
the bank "'were not trust funds'" was not supported by the evidence. 30 It then answered in the affirmative the following question:
Where an agent has money in his possession belonging to
his principal,which he deposits in his own general bank account with the intention of paying the sum due his principal by check drawn on that account; and where at the time
of the deposit the agent is indebted to the bank on a past
due obligation, and the bank accepts the deposit with
knowledge that the agent holds the money in trust for the
benefit of his principal, and sets off the amount of the debt
of the agent against the deposit; where at the time the bank
applies the deposit on the debt of the agent it has not
changed its position to its detriment in reliance upon said
deposit; can the principal recover from the bank that portion of the deposit
which the agent held in trust for his use
31
and benefit?
The affirmative answer is based on the principle that misapplied
trust funds can be traced and subjected to the use of the trust beneficiary unless acquired by a bona fide purchaser, and particular reliance is placed on a Minnesota case, Agard v. People's Nat'l
Bank.32 Boettcher v. Colorado Nat'l Bank33 was overruled, and
Sherberg v. First Nat'l Bank3 4 was modified, to the extent inconsistent with the instant opinion.
Mr. Justice Sutton, concurring specially, disagreed that the
bank should be held to have accepted the $6,120 deposit without
knowledge of its special status, stating that "as a matter of law the
bank knew this was trust money and specially deposited. '35
Mr. Justice Frantz, also concurring specially, would have disposed of the case entirely on the basis of the language of the deposit slip used in connection with the $6,120 deposit, stating that
the bank was acting as Rust's agent for collection of the $6,120
check; that the bank did not acquire title to the check by its endorsement thereon; that the legal relations between the bank and
Rust could not be changed by the bank's unilateral act; and that all
28 Metropolitan State Bank v. Cox, 13.4 Colo. 260, 302 P.2d 188 (1956).
29 138 Colo. at 583, 336 P.2d at 746.
30 Ibid.
31 Id. at 583, 336 P.2d at 747.
32 169 Minn. 438, 211 N.W. 825 (1927).
33 15 Colo. 16, 24 Pac. 582 (1890).
34 122 Colo. 407, 222 P.2d 782 (1950).
35 138 Colo. at 588, 336 P.2d at 749.
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questions in the case should be resolved "on the basis of Rust being
the owner of the check. '36 Just how Mr. Justice Frantz reasons from.
this statement to his concurring result is not clear.
Mr. Justice Hall, joined by Mr. Justice Knauss, dissented, finding no support in the record to justify the majority's conclusion
that $5,000 of the $6,120 was received by Rust as trustee for
Cox. Rather, in the opinion of the dissenters, Rust acted as agent
for Cox only until Cox transferred title to the truck to Rust in exchange for Rust's checks, at which time the purposes of the agency
were accomplished and the relation between Rust and Cox became
that of debtor and creditor, evidenced by the checks to Cox. The
dissenting opinion particularly emphasizes that the record does not
support any conclusion that Cox ever had any knowledge of the
purchaser's identity, the purchaser's check, or that Cox had ever
issued any instructions with respect to that check. The opinion concludes that there was nothing to indicate creation of an express
trust or from which to imply a resulting trust, particularly in view
of the fact that Cox, in bringing suit against Rust, introduced in evidence Rust's checks to Cox and did not claim any breach of duty
by Rust as agent or trustee.
The majority opinion simply states flatly that the funds deposited were trust funds, ostensibly because they were funds held
by an agent for the benefit of his principal. But that conclusion is
reached without dealing squarely with the questions raised by the
dissenters as to the scope of the agency and whether the agency had
terminated prior to the deposit. This appears particularly unfortunate in view of reliance, to a substantial extent, by both the majority and the dissenters, on the same evidence of record in support
of their respective positions.
2) Ratification
Hayutin v. Gibbons37 raised the question of liability of alleged
principals to a third person with whom the purported agent had
contracted for the furnishing of materials. The trial court found on
conflicting evidence that no agency had been created but that one
of the defendants subsequently had promised to pay for the materials. The Supreme Court, affirming judgment against that defendant, held that the express promise to pay effected a ratification
of the unauthorized act.
In Jahn v. Park Hill Realty Co., 38 an action for a real estate
broker's commission, the defense was that only one of two joint
owners of the property had signed an extension of the broker's exclusive listing. During the extension period, in which the broker
continued his efforts to sell the property with the knowledge and
consent of both owners, the owners signed a contract of sale and
accepted a deposit thereunder. The Supreme Court affirmed a trial
court finding that the non-signing owner had ratified execution of
the extension.
3)

Workmen's Compensation Act 39 "Employer"

In Snyder v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,40 Snyder agreed to
install sidewalks in Denver. He was not licensed to do so under the
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 593, 336 P.2d at 752.
338 P.2c 1032 (Colo. 1959).
347 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1959).
Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 81 (1953).
138 Colo. 523, 335 P.2d 543 (1959).
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applicable Denver ordinance, nor did he carry workmen's compensation insurance. In accordance with his prior practice, Snyder
agreed with Dillie, who was licensed and who carried such insurance, to do the work jointly, each using his own employees, with
profits to be divided equally. Pursuant to the ordinance, Dillie obtained a permit for the job and placed his stamp on the completed
sidewalks as the contractor responsible for workmanship and materials. Lopez, one of Snyder's employees, was shifted from one job
Lo another as required. While performing a task at Dillie's direction, Lopez injured his back. The district court, in an action in
which Dillie was a respondent, sustained the Industrial Accident
Commission's award of compensation to Lopez after dismissal of
the proceedings as to Dillie and his insuror. On appeal, Snyder contended that Lopez was a statutory "employee" of Dillie. 41 The Supreme Court, reversing and remanding, held that the definition of
"employee" was inapplicable but that both Snyder and Dillie were
statutory "employers, '42 since they were engaged as principals in a
joint enterprise making them jointly responsible under the act.
4) One Spouse as Agent for the Other
In Broomhall v. Edgemont Mining Co., Inc.43 a husband was

held to have acted as agent for his wife in a series of transactions
involving mining property in which he handled all their business,
the wife testifying that she " 'left everything to Walter.' ,44 Among
the questions raised was his authority to execute a general release.
The Supreme Court held that the evidence supported the trial
court's finding that the agency existed despite lack of express authorization from the wife.
5) Attorneys at Law
In 1959, Colorado cases included two disbarment cases, 42 neither
of which is considered appropriate for comment here, and an at4
torney-suspension case of greater interest. In Howard v. Hester 6
"lawyers
the Supreme Court affirmed the established principle that
and real estate men stand in a confidential relation to their clients
and principal, and extreme care must be exercised by them to see
that their transactions bear the searching light of fair and aboveboard dealing, '47 and approved the trial court's cancellation of a
cognovit note executed by an incompetent 85-year-old woman in
41 Colo. Rev. Stat § 81-9-1 (1953) provides: "Any person, company or corporation operating or
engaged in or conducting any business by leasing, or contracting out any part or allof the work there.
of to any lessee, sublessee, contractor or subcontractor, irrespective of the number of employees engaged
in such work, shall be construed to be and be an employer as defined in this chapter, and shall be
liable as provided in this chapter to pay compensation for injury or death resulting therefrom to said
lessees, sublessees, contractor and subcontractors and their employees, and such employer as in this section defined, before commencing said work, shall insure and keep insured his liability as herein provided and such lessee, sublessee, contractor or subcontractor as well as any employee of such lessee,
sublessee, contractor or subcontractor, shall be deemed employees as defined in this chapter. Such employer
shall be entitled to recover the cost of such insurance from said lessee, sublessee, contractor or subcontractor and may withhold and deduct the same from the contract price or any royalties or other
money due, owing or to became due said lessee, sublessee, contractor or subcontractor. If said lessee,
or sublessee, contractor or subcontractor doing any work as provided in this section shall himself be
an employer as defined in this chapter in the doing of such work and shall before commencing said
work insure and shall keep insured his liability for compensation as herein provided then such person,
company or corporation operating, engaged in or conducting said business shall not be subject to the
provisions of this section."
42 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 81-2-612)defines "employer" to include: "Every person, association of persons
• . . who has four or more persons engaged in the same business or employment ....
43 340 P.2d 869 (Colo. 1959).
44 Id. at 872.
45 People v. Sarvas, 342 P.2d 669 (Colo. 1959); People v. Buckles, 343 P.2d 1046 (Cola. 1959).
46 338 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1959).
47 Id. at 109.
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favor of an attorney. In People v. Howard48 the Supreme Court
subsequently suspended the attorney involved while charges against
him were pending before the court's Grievance Cpmmittee, taking
judicial notice of its own records in the prior case.
Thompson v. McCormick 49 arose out of the uncomfortable situation of a plaintiff's attorneys who had been discharged by their
client but were not permitted to withdraw from the case as attorneys of record. The attorneys first moved to withdraw on the
ground of their inability to contact their client in order to prepare
his case. It does not appear from the opinion, however, that the attorneys informed the court at that time of their having been discharged. The court subsequently set the case for trial, giving notice
to the attorneys of record for the plaintiff. Prior to the date set for
trial the attorneys again moved to withdraw, stating that they had
been discharged. This motion was never ruled upon. The attorneys
also advised plaintiff of the trial setting at his last known address,
but plaintiff later testified he did not receive the letter. On the date
set for trial, the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice
upon his failure to appear. The court later denied, after hearing, a
motion by the plaintiff's successor attorneys to vacate the judgment
of dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to vacate the judgment and to grant counsels' motion for
withdrawal, stating: "Clearly plaintiff had the right to discharge
his attorneys and, having done so, they were in no position to bind
plaintiff in any mannr; they had lost their former status as being
his agent for service of certain notices and processes of the court." 50
In denying the motion to vacate, the trial judge had observed: "'To
sustain plaintiff's contention here would be to divest the Courts of
any powers to bring their cases to final determination-for any
litigant, by the means of discharging his attorneys, not engaging
successors, and remaining away from the Courtroom could interminably stay all further proceedings, or if proceedings be had, as
here, claim 'void' the judgment.' "51 On balance, it would appear
that a sounder rule would leave dismissal under such circumstances
in the discretion of the trial judge rather than to assume, as a matter of law, that the unilateral act of a party litigant in discharging
his attorney of record automatically operates to make a subsequent
judgment subject to collateral attack for lack of notice.
48
49
50
51

342 P.2d 635 (Colo. 1959).
138 Colo. 434, 335 P.2d 265 (1959).
Id. at 440, 335 P.2d at 269.
Id. at 439, 335 P.2d at 268.

Lunch With

Rockit

System,

inc.

of Denver
24 HOUR BREAKFAST AND LUNCH SERVICE
At 1649 Broadway

Denver

JANUARY-FEBRUARY

1960

DICTA

ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
APPEALS
BY WILLIAmI

H.

ERICKSON

Member of the Denver firm of Hindry, Erickson & Meyer
This article contains a compilation of the decisions and opinions
of the Supreme Court of Colorado that were handed down from
January 1, 1959, to January 1, 1960, interpreting and construing the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. This review will endeavor to
show the court's interpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure in
the numerical order of the rules. Only those cases involving procedure and appeals which, in the author's opinion, set forth, alter,
or clarify the court's interpretation of the rules will be included in
this article.
RULE 4

In Clark v. National Adjusters, Inc.,' the defendant sought to
attack the service of process under rule 4, claiming that she was
identified in the summons without her middle initial and that the
return of service contained an erroneous address. The court refused
to set aside the service of process for a mere technical error, defect,
or omission in either the summons or the return where the error,
defect, or omission affects no, substantial rights of the defendant.
The court pointed out that the middle initial constitutes no part of
one's name. The erroneous return did not detract from the validity
of the service, in the court's opinion, and the failure to include the
defendant's middle initial in the summons meant nothing, since the
law recognizes but one Christian name.
RULE 5
In Zerobnick v. City and County of Denver,2 the Supreme Court
refused to allow Denver to reinstate a suspended jail sentence in
the superior court that had been imposed for the violation of municipal ordinances, because rules 5 and 7 (b) were not complied with,
and said:
Generally, 'the practice and procedure of superior
courts shall be in accordance with the Colorado rules of
civil procedure.' C.R.S. '53, 1957 Cum. Supp. 37-11-3. Treating the case as a civil proceeding, the Superior Court was
obliged to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure. Did it do so?
The motion to reinstate the jail sentence was a motion
within Rules 5 and 7(b), R.C.P.Colo. By the terms of
Rule 5, a party whose appearance is of record should be
served personally or through his counsel. In this case, the
withdrawal of counsel for Zerobnick in no way affected his
appearance in the case, and it was incumbent on the city to
serve him personally with a copy of the motion or a 'written notice of the hearing of the motion, or * * * a written

notice of application
to set the same for hearing.' Rule 7
3
(b) (1), R.C.P.Colo.

1 348 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1959).
2 337 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1959).
3 Id. at 12-13.
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The court found that Denver had not complied with either the
requirements of a criminal proceeding or a civil proceeding and reversed the action of the superior court in reinstating the sentence.
The court concerned itself in Thompson v. McCormick4 with an
attempt to serve plaintiff's counsel after they were discharged. The
court held that plaintiff's former attorneys could not bind him or
act as his agents for service, and that service on them was ineffectual for any purpose. The trial court had dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint for a partnership accounting, receivership and $20,000
damages, after the plaintiff failed to appear pursuant to a trial setting. No notice of the trial setting ever reached the plaintiff, despite
the efforts of his former attorneys. The court found that the defendant had not complied with the default provisions of rule 55 or
the involuntary dismissal provisions of rule 41, and ruled that there
was no notice or service thereof on the plaintiff, as required by rule
5. The court accordingly reversed the case with direction for the
trial court to sustain the plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgment
of dismissal, and to proceed to trial on the merits. The court said:
The judgment of dismissal having been entered without notice is void and is subject to direct or collateral attack. Laches does not preclude attack upon a void judgment. The court was in error in entering judgment; also in
error in denying plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgment.5
In Pearson v. Pearson,6 however, the court upheld service on a
plaintiff's attorney in a divorce action involving plaintiff's custodial
rights over her children. The service under rule 5 (b) (1) was held
good on the ground that the order determining custody in the interlocutory decree of divorce was not final, and was a matter still
pending before the court. In this case, the plaintiff's counsel had
been discharged and was unable to locate his client to provide
notice of the proceeding to modify the custody award. The trial
court, when the mother failed to appear, entered an order changing
the custody of the children without any evidence that such a change
would serve the best interest of the children. The Supreme Court
reversed the custodial findings of the trial court, but affirmed the
service on the discharged attorneys by stating that one could not
4 138 Colo. 434, 335 P.2d 265 (1959).
5 Id. at "1.42, 335 P.2d at 269-70. But see Davis v. Kaes, 346 P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1959); White,
Green & Addison Associates v. Monarch Oil & Uranium Corp., 347 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1959).
6 347 P.2d 779 (Colo. 1959).
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avoid jurisdiction by discharging his attorney and moving out of
the state.
Also in apparent contrast to Thompson v. McCormick,7 the
court, in White, Green & Addison Associates v. Monarch Oil &
Uranium Corp.," and in Davis v. Klaes,9 upheld judgments that were
taken in the trial court when the defendant failed to appear for
trial after counsel had withdrawn. Both cases can be distinguished
from Thompson v. McCormick on the facts and on the basis that
actual notice had been received by the defendants. In White, Green
& Addison Associates v. Monarch Oil & Uranium Corp. the defendant sought relief under rule 60, and the case is, therefore, set out
under that rule. Davis v. Klaes raised an issue under rule 55 (b)
and is reviewed under rule 55.
RULE 9

The court, in O.K. Uranium Development Co. v. Miller,10 gave
a liberal interpretation to rule 9. The defendants urged as grounds
for dismissal that a complaint seeking rescission for fraud did not
allege fraud with the particularity required by rule 9. The defendants had filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court, but the motion
had not been ruled upon, and the defendants answered over the
motion. Trial was had on the issues made by the complaint and the
answer without the sufficiency of the complaint being challenged.
The court found that the evidence was ample to sustain the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the issue of fraud and granted the
requested rescission. By way of dictum the court suggested that if
the matter of pleading had been raised in the trial court, an
amendment to conform to the evidence would have been in order
under rule 15 (b).
RULE 12
The court dealt with the interpretation of the zoning ordinances
of the City of Westminster and the injunctive power of the district
court in Erickson v. Groomer." The Board of Adjustment had
granted a variance to Erickson to construct an apartment house in
a class "A" residential district. Erickson obtained a building permit
and commenced excavation in accordance with the ruling of the
Board of Adjustment. Groomer, prior to the expiration of the twenty days following service on Erickson, caused his application for a
preliminary injunction to be heard, and the trial court ruled that
the variances and building permits were void, restrained further
building, and directed that the part constructed by Erickson be torn
down. Erickson prayed for relief from the order and pointed out
that a newly enacted zoning ordinance authorized his intended use.
The Supreme Court held that the action taken against Erickson was
defective for two reasons: (1) The trial court was without lawful
authority at the time it entered its final judgment providing for a
permanent injunction, and the judgment was void because it was
taken in violation of rule 12 (a) and before the twenty days set
forth in the summons expired for Erickson to appear and defend.
7 138
9 347
9 346
10 345
11 336

Colo. 434, 335 P.2d 265 (1959).
P.2d 135 (Colo. 1959).
P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1959).
P.2d 382 (Colo. 1959).
P.2d 296 (Colo. 1959).

DICTA

JANUARY-FEBRUARY

1960

(2) The ordinance passed by Westminster rendered the question
before the court moot.
In Koch v. Whitten,12 the court reaffirmed its position on the
granting of a judgment on the pleadings under rule 12 (f). In order
to grant judgment on the pleadings, the court held that the moving
party must show that he is entitled to a judgment under the admitted facts without regard to what the findings might be on the
facts with respect to which issue is joined. The court said that where
a material issue of fact was present which could only be determined
by the taking of testimony, a motion for judgment on the pleadings
is improper. An issue of fact was found in the case by the court,
and the judgment on the pleadings was, therefore, reversed. The
Koch case also clarified rule 12 (f) on motions to strike, with the
following statement:
A mass of evidence unnecessarily pleaded, legal conclusions argued at length, paragraphs seeking to retry a
previous action, all obviously sham matter, may be stricken. Motions to strike alleged redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matters are not favored. If there
is any doubt as to whether under any contingency the matter may raise an issue, the motion should be denied. Even
if the allegations are redundant or immaterial, they could
not be stricken if their presence
in the pleading cannot
13
prejudice the adverse party.
RULE 16
In a case arising out of an auto-pedestrian accident the Supreme Court reversed a judgment favorable to the defendant. 14 An
elderly woman was struck while walking across a highway, and the
issue arose as to whether she was within a crosswalk. The instructions were that there was no crosswalk. The complaint alleged that
she was within a crosswalk, and the Supreme Court held that the
admission by the defendant at the pre-trial conference that the acts
occurred at the time and place alleged in the complaint was tantamount to a stipulation of fact which dispensed with the necessity of
proof. The trial court, therefore, was held to have committed reversible error in instructing the jury on a fact situation that was
inconsistent with the stipulation at the pre-trial conference, and the
action was reversed.
RULE 24
In Hercules Equipment Co. v. Smith, 5 the court reversed the
action of the trial court in allowing a stranger to the action to intervene and obtain a temporary and permanent restraining order
against the Sheriff of the City and County of Denver. The facts
were these: the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant
and caused an execution to be issued against an automobile. The
defendant's wife filed a motion for a restraining order, claiming
ownership of the automobile and attaching a copy of her title to the
car. The trial judge granted the restraining order, restrained the
12
13
14
15

342 P.2d 1011 (Colo. 1959).
Id. at 1015, quoting 2 Moore, Federal Practice % 12.21 (1)-(2) at 2314-18 (2d ed. 1948).
Allison v. Trustee, 344 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1959).
138 Colo. 458, 335 P.2d 255 (1959).
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sheriff from proceeding further in execution on the automobile and
from retaining possession of the car. The plaintiff urged on writ of
error that the wife's title was obtained in fraud of creditors and
therefore was void. The record failed to support the plaintiff's
position, and the court struck the fraud claim for failure of the
plaintiff to comply with the affirmative pleading provisions of rule
8(c). However, the record disclosed that the wife had filed her
motion without leave of court and had not obtained permission to
intervene in accordance with rule 24(a) (3), and that she was a
complete stranger to the case. The court found that the wife had
an adequate remedy at law by way of replevin and that an injunction should not have been granted. The record disclosed that the
sheriff had not received notice of the proceedings in which the injunction was obtained, and the court accordingly reversed the action and directed that the motion for restraining order be stricken
and that all parties be permitted to take such steps as they deemed
advisable in the trial court.16
RULE 26
The widely publicized decision in Lucas v. District Court,17
came about when the plaintiff took a deposition in an automobile
accident case and the defendants refused to disclose the amount of
the policy limits of the liability insurance policies owned by them,
although they admitted in the course of the deposition that such insurance policies existed. The plaintiff moved for an order requiring the defendants to disclose the policy limits of their liability insurance, and the motion was denied by the district court. In an
original proceeding, the Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus
commanding the district court to expunge from the record the order
denying the plaintiff the right to discover the insurance limits and
requiring the defendants to supply the requested information.
The principal issue in the Lucas case, in the court's opinion, was
whether discovery of the insurance policy limits was relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action. The court held that
the term "relevant" is not limited to matter which is admissible in
evidence at the trial, but "includes all of those things which are
relevant to the subject matter of the action." The court said, "In
our view, the term 'relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action' includes inquiries as to the existence of liability
insurance and the policy limits of such insurance."'
The problem dealt with by the court in the Lucas case has been
the subject of many decisions and articles. 19 The court reviewed
the many decisions upholding discovery of the type before the court
and those denying such discovery, and said, "The thread which runs
through all of these decisions in that the term 're!evant' is not lim16 See Groendyke Transport Co. v. District Court, 343 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1959); Howard v. International Trust Co., 338 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1959).
17 345 P.2d 1064 (Colo. 1959), 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 387.
18 Id. at 1068.
19 See, e.g., accord, Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (S.D. Tenn. 1951); Orgel
v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 99, 73 P.2d
605 (1937); People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 III. 2d 231, 135 N.E.2d 588 (1957); Maddox v. Graumon,
265 S.W. 2d 939(Ky. 1954); Frank, Discovery and Insurance Coverage, 1959 Ins. L.J. 281; Levit, Discovery
of Liability Limits Before Trial, 1959 Ins. L.J. 246; Roberts, A Reappraisal of Discovery Procedure Per.
mitting Disclosure of Liability Insurance Limits, 6 Defense I.J. 238; Williams, Discovery of Dollar Limits
in Liability Policies in Automobile Tort Cases, 10 Ala. L. Rev. 355 (1958); Wright, Recent Trends in the
Practical Use of Discovery, 16 NACCA L.J. 409 (1955). Contra, Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68
N.W.2d 649 (1955); Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 673 (1955).
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ited to matter which is admissible in evidence at the trial or which
will properly lead to admissible evidence, but includes all of those
'20
things which are relevant to the subject matter of the action.
The court stated that the term "relevant" must be given a liberal interpretation and that the rules contemplate that a deponent
shall answer all questions, except those to which he objects on the
ground of privilege, and that objections based on admissibility are
to be saved until the actual trial.
In concurring with the result, Mr. Justice Frantz emphasized
the wording of the rule and particularly the portion relating to the
claim or defense of any other party. Mr. Justice Sutton vigorously
dissented, and Mr. Justice Moore, on rehearing, questioned not only
the procedure, but the result.
The procedural problem involved in the Lucas case will be approached in the review of rule 106, since the court declared rule
106 to be inapplicable to original proceedings in the Supreme Court.
The Lucas case caused insurance counsel representing companies which issued more than fifty per cent of the liability insurance written in Colorado to rise to the defense and seek relief in the
Supreme Court by way of a petition for rehearing. On rehearing,
the insurance counsel who appeared as amici curiae, claimed that
the pronouncement of the court violated a number of constitutional
provisions, and the court summarized their claims as follows:
• * * violation of due process, state and federal; equal
protection of laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution; privileges and
immunities in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and
of Article V, Sec. 25 of the Colorado Constitution; searches
and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution and Sec. 7, Article II of the Colorado
Constitution. They (amici curiae) finally argue that the
ruling constitutes 2invasion
by the judiciary of the province
1
of the Legislature.
The court adhered to its former ruling with minor procedural
and factual corrections, and the right of a plaintiff to know what
insurance coverage the defendant has is now established in Colorado.
The court said as a conclusion to its original opinion:
As a result of our study of the rules, the statute and the
decisions of other jurisdictions, it is our opinion that the
holding which allows questions to be propounded in pretrial depositions for the purpose of eliciting information as
to the existence of liability insurance and the policy limits
of such liability insurance is the better rule, and the one
which is more in accord with the object, purpose and
philosophy of the Rules of Civil Procedure. This object and
purpose is served by holding that the scope of examination
is broad. This will have a tendency to eliminate secrets,
mysteries and surprises and should promote disposition of
cases without trial and
22 substantially just results in those
cases which are tried.
20 345 P.2d at 1070.
21 Id. at 1074.
22 Id. at 1070.
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The Rules of Civil Procedure admittedly induce pre-trial settlements, and the Lucas case, in the author's opinion, will eliminate
many of the last minute settlements that are made on the court
house steps. The opinion of the court will enable the parties to
evaluate a claim at arm's length and not within the hidden recesses
of unknown insurance coverage. Lucas is a landmark decision that
grants unto all litigants the wide latitude of discovery which the
draftsmen of the rules intended, and which is eminently fair and in
complete accord with rule 26 (b) .23
Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. District Court24 is in sharp contrast to
the Lucas opinion. The railroad patterned an original proceeding in
mandamus after the Lucas case, and the Supreme Court denied the
application and indicated that the petition was not sanctioned by
the Rules of Civil Procedure. The facts upon which the controversy
centered were that interrogatories were propounded pursuant to
rule 33 and within the scope of rule 26 (b), and the plaintiff refused
to answer the interrogatories. The railroad, the defendant in the
trial court, moved to compel answers to the interrogatories, and the
trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court found that the
answers were relevant in part, but held that the correctness of the
trial judge's action on the interrogatories could be adequately reviewed by writ of error. A party, in the court's opinion, who appears on writ of error and who has refused to make discovery, does
so at his peril, and such conduct may well be the basis for reversal
of a favorable judgment that was obtained by the party who refused to make discovery. The court distinguished its pronouncement from the Lucas decision by saying that the information sought
in that case could not be had by any other procedure. The court
also indicated that the rules did not provide for the filing of a petition for a writ of mandamus for the relief requested and that the
petition could have been stricken rather than denied.
RULE 34
In Michael v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co.,25 the suicide clause
of a life insurance policy was urged as a defense to a claim made
by the insured's beneficiary. Rule 34 was the pivotal issue in the
case. The defendant insurance company obtained an order from
the trial court requiring the plaintiff to produce a copy of the investigation report made by the United States Army for the purpose of determining the cause of death. The plaintiff claimed that
the document was not in her possession or control and that the
court could not order the plaintiff to take steps to make the report
available to the defendant. The Supreme Court held that under
rule 34, the plaintiff must produce, subject to the limitations of rule
26(b), all documents which are obtainable by the order or direction of the litigant, and said that actual possession of the documents
or things is not necessary if the litigant has control of them.
23 See 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 646 (1950).
24 347 P.2d 495 (Colo. 1959).
25 138 Colo. 450, 334 P.2d 1090 (1959).
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RULE 38

A petition in contributory dependency brought McBain v. Lopez 26 before the court by writ of error. A referee of the juvenile
court took evidence and found paternity existed and ordered that
support be paid, but granted Lopez ten days to appeal the findings
and recommendations to the judge of the juvenile court. Lopez
filed a motion for a new trial and request for a jury in compliance
with the referee's ruling, but did not serve McBain or her counsel
with a copy of the motion. Nearly a year later, but before the motion was disposed of, McBain caused Lopez to be cited for contempt
for failure to pay the support that was ordered by the referee and
claimed that the failure of Lopez to properly serve the motion nullified the appeal. Lopez moved to dismiss the citation, and the court
honored his motion and granted him a jury trial. At the subsequent
trial, the issue of paternity was resolved by a jury in Lopez's favor.
On appeal the Supreme Court recognized the failure to serve McBain with a motion but held that Lopez had complied with the
referee's order. In examining the incomplete record and affirming
the lower court, the court said that in the absence of a record showing otherwise, it must be assumed that a full-scale hearing was had
and all issues submitted to the jury under proper instructions.
RULE 50

In Mountain States Mixed Feed Co. v. Ford,27 the court upheld
the trial court in granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The plaintiff claimed damages for money had and received by the
defendant for allegedly issuing false weight certificates in excess
of the actual grain delivered to the plaintiff. At the close of the
plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, and the
court reserved its ruling. The jury brought in a verdict against the
defendant, and a motion for a new trial was filed, alleging as one
ground therefor that the trial court had erred in failing to grant the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The court overruled the
motion for a new trial, but vacated the judgment, thus in effect
granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
On appeal, the defendant urged that the plaintiff's motion was
not in compliance with rule 50(b), but the Supreme Court upheld
the trial court, stating that it would be manifestly unjust to give the
technical interpretation to rule 50 (b) that the defendant urged. The
motion filed by the defendant, in the court's opinion, was sufficient
to authorize the trial 28court to enter judgment in his favor, notwithstanding the verdict.
In Barth v. Burt Chevrolet, Inc.,29 the plaintiff sought to recover
from the defendant on a chattel mortgage on a truck. The defendant asserted two counterclaims, one for the wrongful taking of the
truck, and one for wrongful attachment that was levied upon his
bank account by the plaintiff. Service of the writ of attachment and
notice of levy was not effected upon the defendant. At the close of
the defendant's opening statement, the trial court honored the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim for conversion
26 138
27 343
28 See
29 342

Colo. 482, 334 P.2d 1097 (1959).
P.2d 828 (Colo. 1959).
also Crouch v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., 343 P.2d 1052 (Colo. 1959).
P.2d 637 (Col.. 1959).
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of the truck. At the conclusion of the trial, the plaintiff moved to
dismiss the counterclaim for wrongful attachment, and that motion
was granted, and a verdict was directed in favor of the plaintiff for
the amount prayed for in the complaint. The Supreme Court held
that there were factual issues that were clearly open for determination by the jury and that the errors of the trial court required reversal.
Schweizer v. Amalgamated Butcher Workmen" upheld the
trial court's direction of a verdict in favor of the defendant. In the
case before the court, the plaintiff claimed that she had been hired
by the defendant and was unjustly discharged and sought damages
under her employment contract. The court found that a review of
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff did not present a question upon which the minds of reasonable men might
differ; and since the plaintiff failed to establish the allegations of
her complaint, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling directing
a verdict for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's evidence.
In prosecuting her writ of error, the plaintiff attempted to introduce matters not included in her complaint, and the court refused
to consider her new claim when it was raised for the first time on
writ of error and was not before the trial court.
RULE 52
In Mowry v. Jackson,31 a suit involving the right of a veteran
to purchase a parcel of land under the Veterans Act from the Land
Board, the trial court was found to be in error for failure to comply
with the clear mandate of rule 52(a). The trial court had found
against the plaintiff and made no definite findings of fact, stating
that they were in the record. The court, in emphasizing the wording of rule 52 (a), said:
It is the Rule itself which leaves the matter in the
sound discretion of the trial court as to whether the findings shall be written or oral, but that discretion does not
mean that no findings of fact need be made. The court has
a duty to make one or the other and if made orally to see
that his statement thereon is transcribed in full. In either
event, such findings must be so explicit as to give the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial
court's decision and to enable 3it2 to determine the ground
on which it reached its decision.
The court pointed out that it is not necessary to request findings
of fact for the purpose of review. On the basis of the court's decisions, it is anticipated that in the future where necessary findings
of fact are lacking and review is sought, our court will not dismiss
the writ, but will vacate the judgment and remand the case to the
trial court for appropriate findings of fact; and if this procedure
cannot be followed,
the judgment will be reversed and remanded
33

for a new trial.
In its pronouncement, the court supplants its ruling in Mass34

achusetts Bonding & Investment Co. v. Central Finance Corp.,
30 347 P.2d 516 (Colo. 1959).
31 343 P.2d 833 (Colo. 1959).
32 Id. at 836.
33 See Irish v. United States, 225 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1955).
34 124 Cola. 379, 237 P.2d 1079 (1951).
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where the court approved the action of the trial court in merely
making an oral finding to the effect that the issues joined were in
favor of the plaintiff.
RULE 53
In Hutchinson v. Elder,35 the Supreme Court reversed the trial
court for setting aside the findings and conclusions of the master.
The issues framed by the pleadings on the interpretation of a contract were referred to a master for hearing. The trial court, after
the master conducted a full hearing and made his report, found the
contract to be unambiguous and set aside the findings and conclusions of the master. The court held that the trial court committed
error in rejecting the master's report and said:
Rule 53 (3) (2) R.C.P. Colo. provides:
'In an action to be tried without a jury the court shall
accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly errone-

ous.

* * *'

That the rule binds the district court to accept the findings of a master just as effectively as rule 52 (a) binds this
court to accept findings of a trial court is not a new principle and has long been recognized.... 3
RULE

55

Davis v. Klaes37 upheld the action of the trial court in taking

a judgment over the defendant's objection that the three-day notice
requirement set forth in rule 55 (b) (2) had not been complied
with. The judgment was entered when the defendant failed to appear for trial at the time set by the court. He had made a general
appearance, filed an answer, had personal knowledge of the day set
for trial, and had contacted the court on the date that the case was
set for trial. His counsel had withdrawn from the case a month before the trial. When he failed to appear for trial, evidence was taken and the trial proceeded to the conclusion of the plaintiff's case,
at which time judgment was entered. After the judgment was entered, the defendant moved to set aside the judgment on the ground
of inadvertence and excusable neglect. The court found that the
defendant had notice and that the judgment taken was not a default
judgment within the scope of rule 55 requiring a three-day notice.
An examination of the case will disclose that the action taken by
the trial court was not in fact a proceeding in which a default judgment was entered, but was a trial on the merits after issues were
formulated and a trial date set with due notice to the defendant.3 8
RULE 56
Rogerson v. Rudd 39 again voiced the Supreme Court's unwillingness to grant a summary judgment when there is any unresolved
issue of a material fact. Rudd sought to rescind a contract for the
sale of cattle. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant
moved to dismiss, and the trial court sustained the defendant's mo35 344 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1959).
36 Id. at 1092.
37 346 P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1959).
38 Accord, White, Green & Addison Associates v. Monarch Oil & Uranium Corp., 347 P.2d 135 (Colo.
1959). But see Thompson v. McCormick, 138 Colo. 434, 335 P.2d 265 (1959).
39 345 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1959).
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tion and granted judgment on the defendant's counterclaim.
The
40
Supreme Court reversed and remanded that action.
The trial court, when it reviewed the matter pursuant to the
Supreme Court's remand, honored the plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment on the basis of the record and the opinion of the
Supreme Court, dismissed the defendant's counterclaim and took
testimony only on the question of the plaintiff's damage. In finding that there still remained genuine unresolved issues of material
facts which had not been tried, the Supreme Court ruled that the
defendant had been foreclosed in the first trial from presenting evidence in opposition to the plaintiff's claim because of the trial
court's action in granting his motion at the end of the plaintiff's
case and had been denied the privilege of introducing evidence in
the second trial by reason of the court's ruling on the motion for
summary judgment. The defendant had been denied his day in
court, and that, in the court's opinion, was ground for reversal.
In Farrell v. Bashor,41 one of the few cases in which a summary
judgment has withstood appeal, the Supreme Court allowed a summary judgment against the plaintiff to stand on a complaint alleging damages for the overflow of a reservoir. The Supreme Court's
action was predicated more upon the failure of the plaintiff to perfect his appeal in accordance with rules 111, 112 and 115, than it was
upon the defendant's right to a summary judgment under rule 56.
RULE 59
In Howard v. InternationalTrust Co.,42 a motion for a new trial

was filed on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The action
sought an order compelling reconveyance of property conveyed to
Howard by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, who had died after the commencement of the trial, was represented by the trust company. In
affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff,
the court found that the newly discovered evidence that was asserted by the defendant as grounds for a new trial was merely cumulative and found that the trial court was within its discretion in not
granting a new trial.
The court held in Bushner v. Bushner43 that after a judgment
of a trial court is reversed by the Supreme Court with directions for
the trial court to enter a specific judgment, a motion may be filed
for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence by the
party that was successful in the trial court and that the motion
must be considered on its merits. The court said, "Reason and justice require that after a reversal by the Supreme Court, the party
originally successful in the trial court (and only he) can file a motion for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence,
'44
and only on that ground.

The trial court had stricken the motion for a new trial as not
being in compliance with the rules. The evidence presented by the
defendant was not, as viewed by the Supreme Court, newly discovered evidence, and the trial court was held to be in error for striking the motion for not being in compliance with the rules. The
40 Rudd v. Rogerson, 133 Colo. 506, 297 P.2d 533 (1956).
41 344 P.2d 692 (Colo. 1959).
42 338 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1959).
43 348 P.2d 153 (Colo. 1959).
44 Id. at 154.
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court held that the proper procedure would have been for the trial
court to consider the motion for a new trial and overrule it.
In Devlin v. Huffman,45 a habeas corpus proceeding involving
the custody of children, it was urged that the trial court committed
error in dispensing with a motion for a new trial because the court's
action precluded the plaintiffs from presenting newly discovered
evidence which would show perjury on the part of the defendants.
The Supreme Court, in upholding the trial court's ruling dispensing
with a motion for a new trial, repeated the oft quoted law that the
welfare and best interest of the children serve as the paramount
consideration in a custody proceeding. The court refused to consider the newly discovered evidence which was included in affidavit
form in the plaintiff's brief in the Supreme Court and which was
not before the trial court and therefore not properly a part of the
record before the Supreme Court.
RULE 60
In holding again that applications to vacate default judgments
are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that the
Supreme Court will only interfere when that discretion has been
Green & Addison
abused, the court affirmed the judgment in White,
46
Associates v. Monarch Oil & Uranium Corp.
In this case the plaintiffs prayed for possession of certain mining claims that they had leased to the defendant, alleging that the
defendant had not complied with the terms of the leases. A hearing was held with the parties and their counsel present, and at that
time the case was set for trial. On the trial date the court permitted
counsel for the defendants to withdraw his appearance, and then
proceeded to trial. The evidence offered was heard and judgment
was entered in accordance with the complaint. Nearly a month
later the defendant, appearing by new counsel, moved to vacate the
judgment, alleging surprise, a meritorious defense, irregularities in
the proceedings, and that the ends of justice demanded that the
judgment be vacated. The defendant also claimed that it was denied a fair trial by the court's action in allowing defendant's counsel
to withdraw without granting a continuance to the defendant to secure other counsel. The record disclosed that defense counsel and
the court had notified the defendant of the firmness of the trial
date. Witnesses had been brought from a distance by the plaintiff.
45 339 P.2d 1008 (Colo. 1959).
46 347 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1959).
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In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Supreme Court
again reiterated that parties cannot be permitted to disregard the
process of the court, and then, after judgment, come in at their
convenience upon the mere allegation 47of the existence of a meritorious defense and vacate the judgment.
In Lohr v. Wills,4 s the plaintiff sued to cancel a water lease that

was executed with a deed of trust as security for a loan. The defendant asserted counterclaims against the plaintiff, and defenses
of laches and the statute of limitations. It was admitted that the
loans which were made at the time the lease and deed of trust were
executed had been paid. The case was determined on the basis of
the motions for summary judgment made by both the plaintiff and
the defendant and supporting exhibits and stipulations of the parties. The trial court ruled that the water lease was terminated
upon the payment of the loan. The defendant promptly filed a designation of record for appellate purposes. Immediately thereafter
the plaintiff filed a motion under rule 60 to correct the judgment
and findings of fact on the ground that the judgment should have
been entered on the motions for summary judgment and the evidence embodied in the stipulation of the parties and the exhibits,
and not in a form which would indicate that the issues were submitted and the case tried on the merits. The trial court entered corrected findings of fact and conclusions of law, again reviewed the
facts as stipulated, and entered its corrected findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
The defendant contended that the motion made by the plaintiff
was a motion to alter or amend the judgment under rule 59 and
should have been made within ten days after the entry of judgment,
and not being timely made, should have been denied. The plaintiff
contended that his motion was made under rule 60(a) for correction of a clerical mistake and under rule 60(b) for correction of a
mistake or for inadvertence and that the rule granted him six
months to make such a motion. In affirming the position taken by
the plaintiff, the court found that if the mistake was a clerical error, the motion was filed before the case was docketed on error and
was done within the required time; and that if it was a judicial mistake or inadvertence that the correction was made long before the
six months expired. The court cited numerous authorities supporting the action taken by the trial court and classifying the correction
as a clerical mistake.
A cognovit note came before the court in Kean v. Brown 4 9 in
an effort by the defendant to vacate a judgment and to enjoin enforcement of the judgment. Judgment had been entered pursuant
to the provisions of the note. The defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment, which motion was admittedly inadequate. He
filed a second motion to vacate, and tendered his answer and a thirdparty complaint with the motion. The plaintiff moved to strike the
second motion, and it was stricken by the court. The defendant
urged that the plaintiff had perpetrated a fraud on the trial court
in not setting out the defenses which the defendant asserted. On
writ of error, the court held that the question for the trial court to
47 Accord, Davis v. Kaes, 346 P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1959).
48 347 P.2d 518 (Colo. 1959).
49 346 P.2d 298 (Colo. 1959).
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determine was whether a meritorious defense was tendered in the
answer which was filed with the defendant's second motion to vacate. The court said that an attorney had no obligation to inform
the court as to the possible defenses that were available or were
claimed by the defendant, and that the court's finding that there
was no fraud perpetrated upon it by the plaintiff in obtaining the
judgment complained of was entitled to substantial weight. The
court, however, reversed the trial court, with directions for the trial
court to determine whether a meritorious defense was tendered in
the answer presented to the court with the second motion to vacate.
RULE

65

In Renner v. Williams,5° the court reaffirmed its earlier jurisdictional pronouncement in Erickson v. Groomer5' and reversed the
trial court's decision for not complying with rule 65. The plaintiffs
were officers and directors of a corporation that owned a tavern
that was managed by the defendant. Pursuant to corporate resolution, the tavern was closed and the defendant manager and his wife
were discharged. The defendant obtained an ex parte temporary
restraining order granting him possession of the tavern and prohibiting the plaintiffs from interfering with him in his operation
and management of the tavern. The plantiffs refused to comply
with the court order and were cited for contempt. At the hearing
on the citation, the plaintiffs attacked the validity of the restraining
order on the ground that it was not issued in compliance with rule
65 and was, therefore, void. At the hearing on the citation, the trial
court made the temporary injunction permanent. In declaring the
temporary restraining order to be void, the Supreme Court held
that rule 65 had not been complied with, and said:
Having been issued without notice, it did not define
the injury to the applicant or state why it was of such nature as to be irreparable; the reason for issuance without
notice; the time or date of its expiration or the date of hearing for a preliminary injunction. More significant was the
failure of the court to set or require any security to be
given by the applicant. Any one of the deficiencies noted
was sufficient to render the order a nullity. This court had
occasion to consider directly the effect of failure to require the giving of security to protect the person enjoined
in Stull v. District Court, 135 Colo. 86, 308 P. 2d 1006. We
follow the holding in the Stull case that a restraining order issued without compliance with the requirement for
giving5 2security is without validity and of no force and
effect.

The invalidity of the restraining order was also held to be a
valid defense to the contempt proceeding against the plaintiffs. The
court held that the trial court issued its permanent injunction prior
to the time fixed in the summons for the plaintiffs to appear and
only had before it at the time of the hearing on the contempt citation the
issue of whether or not the plaintiffs were in contempt of
53
court.

50 344 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1959).
51 336 P.2d 296 (Colo. 1959).
52 344 P,2d at 967.

53 Accord, Erickson v. Groomer, 336 P.2d 296 (Colo. 1959).
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The plaintiff brought an original proceeding in prohibition in
Dyonisio v. McWilliams, 54 to stop proceedings in the district court
that had been commenced against him by the Transit Equipment
Company (a foreign corporation), the Denver National Bank, and
others. The Transit Equipment Company sought to impose a constructive trust and an equitable lien on funds in the hands of the
Denver National Bank, and on funds to be received in the future.
In support of its prayer it obtained a temporary restraining order
impounding the funds in the possession of the bank. Dyonisio was
served by publication and a temporary injunction then issued. The
Denver National Bank disclaimed any interest in the funds and
agreed to abide by any lawful order of the court. The facts were
that Dyonisio and the Transit Equipment Company had contracted
to supply seventy-five used trollies to Sao Paulo, Brazil. Transit
advanced moneys to Dyonisio, only to find that Dyonisio and his
associate made the sale excluding the Transit Equipment Company.
The court, in approving the action of the trial court, stated that
there was a res within the State of Colorado upon which jurisdicion could attach. The court approved the service of summons by
55
publication, approving its former holding in Hoff v. Armbruster,
since the action was in rem and not in personam, and said, "Essentially, the object of the action was to reach and dispose of the individual interest of each nonresident defendant in specific property
located in Colorado, by enforcing what was alleged to be a valid
-56
contract respecting that identical property ....
The plaintiff in Ambrosio v. Baker Metropolitan Water & Sanitation Dist.5 7 brought suit to enjoin the construction of a sewage
disposal plant. The court found that a condemnation suit had been
instituted by the district, an order for immediate possession had
been entered, the land had been acquired and paid for and the sewage plant erected and placed in full operation, rendering the issues
before the court moot. By way of dictum, the court announced
that an injunction will not lie to prevent suits in eminent domain,
because the respondent in an eminent domain action has an adequate remedy at law for damages for the property taken. The writ
of error was, therefore, dismissed.
RULE 81

Rule 81 (b) has been abrogated by the new statutes on divorce
and separate maintenance, which provide that "The process, practice and proceedings shall be in accordance with the rules of civil
procedure except as expressly modified or otherwise provided in
this article. ''58 And that "The process, practice and proceedings
shall be in accordance with the rules of civil procedure." 59
Rule 81(c) came before the court on four occasions. Andrews
60
v. Lull

and McKelvey v. District Court 1 both involved original

proceedings in the Supreme Court in the nature of prohibition, and
54 338 P.2d 684 (Colo. 1959).
55 125 Colo. 324, 244 P.2d 1069 (1959).
56 338 P.2d at 687-88, quoting from

Hoff v. Armbruster, supro note 55. See

Ace Flying Service, 338 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1959).
57 340 P.2d 872 (Colo. 1959).
58 Colo. Laws 2d Reg. Sess. 1958, ch. 37, § 3, at 222 (divorce).

59 Colo. Laws 2d Reg. Sess. 1958, ch. 38, § 1, at 225 (separate maintenance).

60 341 P.2d 475 (Colo. 1959).
61 345 P.2d 726 (Colo. 1959).
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both cases held that an appeal from the county to the district court
had been waived for failure to
perfect an appeal within the ten-day
62
period allowed by the statute.
In Andrews v. Lull, the Supreme Court held that the ten-day
period was not extended by the filing of a motion for a new trial
and said, "If [appellant] desires to appeal to the district court for a
trial de novo and wishes also to file a motion for a new trial, he
must either have his motion acted upon within the statutory ten-day
period or secure an extension of time to lodge his appeal ....
64
In Erbaugh v. Jacobson,
the court answered the argument that
a motion for a new trial under rule 59 (f) was a condition precedent
to the right to appeal to the district court from judgments of the
county court, by holding that the only requisites for trial de novo in
the district court are that there be a final judgment in the county
court and an appeal lodged in the district court within the time and
requirements of the applicable statutes.
The court refused to countenance an appeal in Vigil v. Vigil,65
of a divorce action that was tried in the county court by the mere
filing of a pleading entitled "Amended Complaint in Divorce Appeal," in the district court.
97
The Supreme Court reviewed Geer v. Hall66 by writ of error.
It was a certiorari proceeding in the district court that stemmed
from a hearing before the Manager of Safety of the City of Denver
on an application for a three-way liquor license. In reversing the
judgment of the district court granting a three-way liquor license
on the basis of the printed record, the court found that the motion
and affidavit for disqualification of the trial judge under rule 97
for prejudice should have been granted.
RULE

RULE 102
Aero Spray, Inc. sued Ace Flying Service for goods sold and
delivered. Both of the parties were foreign corporations. Aero

Spray, Inc. v. Ace Flying Service, Inc.6 7 The State of Colorado was

indebted to the Ace Flying Service for approximately the amount
claimed by the plaintiff. Aero Spray, Inc. caused a writ of attachment and a garnishee's summons in aid thereof to be served upon
the state comptroller, who acknowledged the indebtedness to the
defendant. Service was had upon the defendant by publication and
mailing of notice of levy. The defendant filed a motion entitled
"Special Appearance and Motion to Quash Return of Service and to
Quash and Dissolve Writ of Attachment and Writ of Garnishment."
The trial court, on the basis of the motion, dismissed the case. The
Supreme Court held that it was error to dismiss the plaintiff's case,
since the relief granted was more than that which was prayed for
by the defendant. It was error to dismiss an action for failure to
obtain proper service, because in the court's view the defects in
service that were complained of could be corrected by proper serv62 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-6-11(1) (1953).
63 341 P.2d at 479.
64 343 P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1959).
65 338 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1959).
66 138 Colo. 384, 333 P.2d 1040 (1959).
67 338 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1959).
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ice at any time. The court formulated the attachment issues and
found the law to be as follows:
First: Can a foreign corporationplaintiff, not qualified
to do business in Colorado, proceed in attachment and garnishment in this state and thereby subject personal property, in the form of a chose in action due from a resident to
defendant, to payment of a debt which has a foreign origin
and which is owing by the foreign corporate defendant to
the said plaintiff?
This question is answered in the .affirmative. Rule 102
(a) R.C.P. Colo. provides in pertinent part:
"The plaintiff, at the time of issuing the summons or
filing the complaint in an action on contract, express or implied, * * * may have the property of the defendant, not
exempt from execution, attached as security for any judgment that may be recovered in such action, in the manner
prescribed in this rule, * * *."

One of the grounds upon which the writ of attachment may
issue is, 'That the defendant is a foreign corporation.' At
no place in the various subsections of the rule governing
attachment procedures is there any provision which excludes foreign corporations from the right to make use of
the remedies of attachment and garnishment. The rule itself provides the answer .... 68
RULE 105

Rule 105 came into play in Clopine v. Kemper,6 9 which was
ancillary to the divorce action of Kemper v. Kemper. 0
The Clopines brought an action under rule 105 to obtain an adjudication of the rights of all parties with respect to certain real
estate which they had acquired from Hazel Kemper. Arthur Kemper filed a lis pendens and a homestead entry on property located
in Sedgwick County, Colorado, before he filed his complaint in divorce in the Denver district court. The trial court struck the homestead entry, because the defendant had never resided on the real
estate, but upheld the lis pendens, and both rulings were approved
by the Supreme Court. The principal case held that the Clopines
were chargeable with notice of the Denver divorce action and that
68 Id. at 277; see Dyonisio v. McWilliams, 338 P.2d 684 (Colo. 1959).
69 344 P.2d 451 (Colo. 1959).
70 344 P.2d 449 (Colo. 1959).
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any rights which they acquired were inferior and subject to Arthur
Kemper's prior claim. In recognizing the early filing of the lis pendens, Mr. Justice Moore said:
It is Hornbook law that the commencement of an action dates from the issuance of the summons and not the
date of filing the complaint. As above noted, this action
was commenced by the issuance of a summons on July 2,
1954, and whether notice of lis pendens began running July
3rd or July 6th is immaterial, for plaintiffs purchased the
property more than two years
after the action was started
71
and the lis pendens was filed.
Mr. Justice Moore's statement as to the commencement of an
action would appear to be contrary to the clear wording of rule 3
(a) and (b), which cause an action to be commenced and jurisdiction to attach only after the time of filing of the complaint or the
service of summons.
The Supreme Court also cast aside the Clopines' contentions
that the lis pendens was invalid because the property upon which
it was imposed was not described in the Denver divorce complaint
and held that only the notice must contain a description of the
property.
Broadway Roofing & Supply, Inc. v. District Court72 was filed
in the Supreme Court as an original proceeding. A rule was directed to the respondents to show cause why they should not be
restrained from enforcing an order entered by the district court
which purported to release a lis pendens recorded against real
estate. The petitioner urged that the district court had abused its
discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction. The petitioner, the plaintiff below, had performed labor and supplied material on real property owned by the Nelsons, who later sold to the Camerons. The
petitioner filed its contract and claimed a lien and brought suit to
foreclose the lien, naming both the Camerons and the Nelsons as defendants. The Camerons moved for summary judgment, and summary judgment was granted and the lis pendens purportedly released.
The Supreme Court found that there was but one claim for relief, and held that under rule 54(b) a final judgment could not be
entered until the claims against all of the parties were finally determined by judgment. It was also held that even if a final judgment could be entered in favor of one defendant, it could only be
entered upon an express determination that there was no just reason for delay. The court therefore held that no final judgment had
been made. Since rule 105 (f) states that a "lis pendens . .. shall

remain in effect for thirty days from the time of entry of final judgment in the trial court" (emphasis added), the lis pendens had not
been released. Accordingly, the rule was discharged by the court.
Cawley v. Cawley' " was a divorce action in which the principal
issue was property settlement. After the entry of the final decree,
the wife filed a petition for property settlement and a lis pendens.
At the hearing on the property settlement the husband offered a
contract for the division of property that had been entered into by
71 Id. at 454.
72 342 P.2d 1022 (Colo. 1959).
73 340 P.2d 122 (Colo. 1959).
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the parties prior to the commencement of the divorce action. The
trial court denied the petition for property settlement and ordered
the lis pendens released. The question of property settlement had
not been reserved for future consideration in the interlocutory or
final decrees of divorce, and the court, therefore, held that the trial
court had no jurisdiction to make a property settlement and that
the wife's rights must rest on her contract.
RULE 106
The remedial writs, whether relief was granted under rule 106,
rule 116, or under article VI, section 3 of the Colorado Constitution, will be reviewed under this rule, except where the writs involved specific procedural questions which have been the subject
of review in earlier parts of this article.
Lucas v. District Court 74 has been quoted more as authority for
a broad interpretation of rule 26 (b) than for a delineation of procedure in the Supreme Court on original proceedings. However,
Lucas sounded the death knell to original proceedings under rule
106. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is recognized by
rule 116, as well as the Colorado Constitution, and the following
cases recognize original jurisdiction, or the court's interpretation of
the remedial writs.
The court held in the Lucas case, which was an original proceeding under rule 106 in the nature of mandamus, that rule 106
does not apply to original proceedings, and said:
The Constitution of Colorado, Article VI, Section 3, declares in referring to this Court that 'It shall have power to

issue writs of * * * mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari,

injunction, and other original and remedial writs, with authority to hear and determine the same. * * *'
In Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781,
we said:
Our authority to entertain remedial writs is conferred
by the Constitution, and 'is not dependent upon, or governed by the statute' or rules of civil procedure on the subject

....

'Those writs, however, are the common law writs

We shall treat this complaint as if it were a petition
seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus or certiorari
as the same existed at common law ....

75

The court's ruling on the original proceedings in the Lucas case
was the subject of a blistering dissent by Mr. Justice Hall, 76 after a
rehearing was held by the Supreme Court, in which he said on the
procedural question:
The majority opinion, contrary to the expressed understanding of all counsel in the matter, states that this is not
a proceeding under Rule 106 for the reason that:
"This rule does not apply to original proceedings."
Such statement runs contrary to dozens of decisions of this
court wherein original proceedings brought in district
74 345 P.2d 1064 (Colo. 1959).
75 Id. at 1066.
76 Id. at 1075 (dissenting opinion).
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courts and this court pursuant to77 this rule have been recognized, sanctioned and approved.
In the opinion of Mr. Justice Hall, rule 106 precludes the granting of the relief that was requested in the Lucas case, because of
the wording of rule 106, which states, "Review shall not be extended further than to determine whether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion."
In the opinion of Mr. Justice Hall, in an original proceeding in
prohibition, mandamus and certiorari, the court may only determine questions of jurisdiction and must scrupulously avoid determination of the merits. Mr. Chief Justice Knauss and Mr. Justice
Sutton joined him in his view.
The proceedings which occurred in 1959 involving prohibition,
mandamus, habeas corpus, and quo warranto (and whether they
were before the Supreme Court as original proceedings or by writ
of error) will be set out under separate headings under this rule.
Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus came into play under rule 106 and
under article VI, section 3 of the constitution in the year 1959, but
no petitioner saw fit to utilize the provisions of the Colorado
habeas
79
78
corpus statute, which is ambiguous, to say the least.

In Lowe v. People, 0 the petitioner sought a release by habeas
corpus after he was returned to Colorado in an extradition proceeding. He pleaded guilty in the district court and was sentenced
to the penitentiary. Thereafter, he claimed that he was illegally
extradited and that his plea of guilty was extracted by coercion, intimidation, and threats and that the trial court acted irregularly
and contrary to law in disposing of the habeas corpus proceedings.
The petitioner appeared pro se, and the court again repeated that
there must be a substantial compliance with the requirements by
even a layman who assumes the burden of representing himself.
The court said:
Habeas corpus may be invoked to question the Court's
jurisdiction of the person or its jurisdiction of the accusation made against him or where the question arises as to
whether the judgment and sentence were within the prescribed statutory limits. A writ of habeas corpus, however,
is not a corrective remedy, and it is never allowed to perform the function of a writ of error.81
The court said that jurisdiction is not impaired by the manner
in which the accused is brought before it, and, therefore, no jurisdictional problem existed. The Supreme Court pointed out that a
writ of error and not a writ of habeas corpus was the proper remedy
to secure relief, if the facts were as the petitioner charged.
Gallegos v. Tinsley 2 was a joint petition for a writ of habeas
corpus filed in the District Court of Fremont County by two of the
defendants who had been convicted of rape in the District Court of
Pueblo County and sentenced to the state penitentiary. They were
77 Id. at 1077 (dissenting opinion).
78 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 65-1-3 (1953).
79 See Scott, Post-Conviction Remedies in Colorado Criminal Cases, 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 249 (1959);
Comment, Habeas Corpus in Colorado for the Convicted Criminal, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 145 (1958).
80 343 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1959).
81 Id. at 633.
82 337 P.2d 386 (Colo. 1959).
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both fifteen years of age. They claimed that the statute8 3 required
that they be sentenced to the state reformatory and not to the penitentiary and that the sentence imposed was void. In sustaining the
trial court, the Supreme Court held that he District Court of Fremont County had equal and coordinate jurisdiction with the District
Court of Pueblo County, and that the District Court of Pueblo
County had jurisdiction of the crime and of the person, and had
the power to pronounce sentence. The court stated again that a
district court, in a collateral proceeding, had no jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the judgment of a court of equal jurisdiction.
Marshall v. Geer8 4 stated the Supreme Court's views on the
reconsideration of a writ of habeas corpus on the same questions
which were reviewed by the Supreme Court on a previous occasion.
The court refused to review a successive application based on the
same grounds as those that were reviewed by it before. The court
held that res judicata applies to habeas corpus proceedings and affirmed the trial court's decision discharging the writ.
Mendez v. Tinsley s3 came about after Mendez was tried and
convicted on an information charging robbery and conspiracy to
commit robbery and erroneously sentenced to the penitentiary for
assault to commit robbery. Mendez was nineteen years old and petitioned for habeas corpus, alleging that he could not be sentenced
to the penitentiary for the crime upon which sentence was pronounced and upon which mittimus issued. The trial court denied
the petition for habeas corpus and set aside the robbery count of
the information, resentenced the defendant for robbery to the penitentiary, and then caused a mittimus to issue on the newly imposed
sentence. In reviewing the trial court's action, the court again said
that the sole question in a habeas corpus proceeding is whether the
court went beyond or exceeded its jurisdiction, and said that the
writ of habeas corpus cannot be substituted for review by writ of
error. The court held that since the information upon which sentence was pronounced was quashed by the trial court, there was
nothing upon which the mittimus or warrant of commitment could
stand, and the judgment of conviction became void, requiring that
the prisoner be discharged.
Quo Warranto
In an original proceeding in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, the court examined the procedure for creating a water con86
servancy district. People v. South Platte Water Conservancy Dist.
The Supreme Court reviewed the findings and conclusions of the
trial court, found that the decree creating the district was a nullity,
and made the ruling to show cause absolute. When the court again
reviewed. the case on a petition for rehearing it found that the petition for'rehearing was not in compliance with rule 118 and could be
stricken because it contained argument and contained no citation of
83 Colo. Rev. Stat. J 39-10-1 (1953).
84 344 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1959).
85 336 P.2d 706 (Colo. 1959).
86 343 P.2d 812 (Colo. 1959).
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authority or reference to the record and briefs in relation to matters
that the court had allegedly overlooked or misapprehended. However, because of the importance of the issues involved, the court did
not strike the petition for rehearing, and again reviewed the matter.
The court ruled that there was no provision for review of the trial
court's proceeding by writ of error and that quo warranto was the
only procedure which afforded adequate relief. The court, therefore, searched the entire record and did not limit the issue to fraud,
lack of jurisdiction, or invalidity on the face of the decree. The
court adhered to its original finding that the statutes for the formation of a water conservancy district had not been complied with.
Prohibition
87
the
In City of Aurora v. Congregation Beth Medrosh Hagodol
court reviewed its earlier pronouncements in Beth Medrosh Hagodol
v. City of Aurora.88 On remand from the earlier case, the trial court
upheld a plea of res judicata, which was raised when Aurora again
sought to condemn a right-of-way through an allegedly public cemetery owned by Beth Medrosh Hagodol. When the Supreme Court
first examined the rights of the litigants, the court had before it an
original proceeding in the nature of prohibition, and in that instance
the court made the rule absolute, with the same parties and the
same condemnation issues before it. The court reviewed its earlier
pronouncement and said that a writ of prohibition is preventive in
that it restrains excessive or an improper assumption of jurisdiction
by a tribunal possessing judicial or quasi-judicial powers, and that
the sole inquiry is whether the inferior judicial tribunal is exercising a jurisdiction which it does not possess, or, having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties, has exceeded its legitimate
powers. The court carefully pointed out that questions of jurisdiction do not encompass consideration of the merits of the cause. The
court found that the allegation regarding the dedication of the property in question as a cemetery was disputed in the earlier case and
that that issue required the presentation of evidence. No evidence
was taken on the issue of dedication of the cemetery to a public use
in the trial court, and the court held that the trial court's finding
therefore prejudiced the City of Aurora. The case was remanded
to the trial court to take evidence on all issues.
Certiorari
In Marker v. City of Colorado Sprinqs,1) the plaintiffs endeavored to review the action of the City of Colorado Springs in granting a use variance permit to erect a medical office building on property zoned as R-3 and located directly across from the GlocknerPenrose Hospital. The court, in affirming the judgment of the trial
court, held that in a certiorari proceeding the scope of review is
limited, and that the authority of the courts to interfere with the
findings of tribunals vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine
particular issues, depends solely upon whether there is any competent evidence to support the findings that were made. The record
contained ample evidence to sustain the findings of the bodies vest87 345 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1959).
88 126 Colo. 267, 248 P.2d 732 (1952).
89 138 Colo. 485, 336 P.2d 305 (1959).
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ed under the ordinance with authority to determine the zoning issues and nothing appeared in the record to indicate that the proceedings or the conclusions reached were arbitrarily or capriciously
arrived at, and the trial court was, therefore, affirmed.90
City and County of Denver v. District Court,91 in an original
proceeding in the nature of certiorari, challenged an order of the
district court awarding the Glendale Water and Sanitation District,
in an eminent domain proceeding, immediate possession of Cherry
Creek. The purpose of the condemnation was to enable the sanitation district to discharge sewage into Cherry Creek, which was admittedly a dry bed throughout the greater part of the year. The
court found this to be comparable to discharging sewage into gutters, streets, and barrow pits. In holding that public waters or beds
or channels of public streams could not be condemned for sewage
purposes, the court made the rule to show cause absolute.
RULE 116
A Public Utilities Commission ruling, granting lower rates to
railroads than to truckers on intrastate hauls, was considered by the
Supreme Court as an original proceeding under rule 116, in Groendyke Transport Co. v. District Court.92 The court, however, would
not allow the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under rule 116
to be invoked to question the trial court's order allowing intervention under rule 24. The court held that a party seeking to invoke
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must be able to show
prima facie, at least, circumstances justifying the exercise of such
jurisdiction and that rule 116 may not be utilized to avoid the requirement of a final judgment.
The issue before the court was "[W] hether an order granting
intervention is of such character and finality as to presumptively
deny to other parties to the action any rights which could not be
adequately reviewed ... by writ of error. ' 93 It was the court's opinion that orders relating to intervention are interlocutory and that
the issue framed by the court required a negative answer.
In People v. Hively,' 4 an original proceeding, the Attorney General of Colorado caused a citation to be issued to the Assessor of
Arapahoe County to show cause why he should not be adjudged in
contempt of court for his failure to comply with the orders of the
Supreme Court in a former original proceeding in mandamus and
prohibition that bore the same name.
In the first proceeding 9 , an order was obtained compelling the
assessor to comply with the directions of the State Board of Equalization, which fixed the valuation of real and personal property in
Arapahoe County, and prohibited the District Court of Arapahoe
County from proceeding further in an action by the assessor and
the residents of Arapahoe County to set aside the orders and directions of the Board of Equalization.
90 Accord, Holly Development, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 342 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1959) (also
held that certiorari is proper remedy when public commission exceeds jurisdiction or abuses discretion);

Civil Service Comm'n v. Conklin, 138 Colo. 528, 335 P.2d 265 (1959).
91 342 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1959).
92 343 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1959).
93 Id. at 537.
94 344 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1959).

95 People ex rel.State Board of Equalization v. Hively, 336 ?.2d 721 (Colo. 1959).
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The assessor, in defense of the contempt citation, urged that the
court lacked jurisdiction, that the Attorney General had not complied with the requirements of rule 25 (d) in substituting the assessor for his predecessor, had not shown that he, as assessor, had continued or threatened to continue the actions of his predecessor, and
that he had not had adequate notice. He also urged that he acted
on the advice of counsel. The Supreme Court cut through the defenses and adjudged the assessor to be in contempt.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE
By AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law
During 19591 the Colorado Supreme Court decided almost fifty
cases on criminal law-a considerable increase over the annual
number in recent years.
I. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

Constitutional Limitations
The Merris case 2 of 1958 contained two great propositions: (1)
The municipal penal ordinance of a home rule city creates a crime,
not a civil wrong, if there exists a counterpart state statute punish-

ing the same conduct or if the ordinance authorizes imprisonment
as punishment. (2) When a state criminal statute punishes conduct
of state-wide concern, the home rule city lacks power to enact a
penal ordinance punishing the same conduct (and conversely, when
a home rule city has enacted a penal ordinance punishing conduct
of local concern, a state statute punishing the same conduct is inapplicable to such conduct committed within the municipal territorial limits).
The first proposition has been generally applauded; its principal effect has been to give municipal violators the same sort of
criminal procedural rights in municipal courts which defendants
enjoy in comparable state trials. The municipal courts seem to have
made the required
adjustment from civil to criminal procedure with
3
little difficulty.
The second proposition of the Merris case has raised more serious problems. What are matters of state-wide concern, over which
the state has exclusive power? What are matters of local concern,
over which the municipality has exclusive power? The trouble is
that it is very difficult to pigeon-hole most matters into one category or the other, because so many matters partake of some of the
qualities of both categories. Thus driving a car in a city after one's
license is suspended or revoked, though held predominantly a matter of statewide concern, is also a matter of concern to the city,
whose inhabitants are the ones endangered. 4 So too speeding upon
the Valley Highway through Denver is held to be a matter primarily of state-wide concern, but to some extent it concerns the city as
well. 5
The question arose in 1959 whether the state, through its legis1 The cases discussed hereii, including a few late-1958 cases, are found in 332 P.2d No. 3
through 347 P.2d No. 4.
2 Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958), discussed in Scott, Municipal Penal
Ordinances in Colorado, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 267 (1958).
3 Zerobnick v. Denver, 337 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1959), held that the Merris case authorizes municipal
courts to suspend sentence and grant probation in cases of ordinance violations-thus overruling the
pre-Merris view to the contrary as expressed in Holland v. McAuliffe, 132 Colo. 170, 286 P.2d 1107
(1955).
4 Davis v. Denver, 342 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1959) ("the city, of course, is interested in preventing unlicensed drivers on its streets").
5 Denver v. Pike, 342 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1959). On the other hand, municipal power to punish
vagrancy and keeping a gambling house was assumed to exist in Zerobnick v. Denver, 337 P.2d 11
(Colo. 1959), discussed at note 3 supra, and Reed v. Denver, 342 P.2d 642 (Colo. 1959).
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lature, could constitutionally delegate to home rule cities concurrent power to enact penal ordinances dealing with matters which
are of both state-wide and local concern. At first the Colorado Supreme Court answered with a loud no, 6 but a few months later it
answered the same question with a somewhat quieter yes.7
To hold that matters which are general are the exclusive preserve of the state, just as matters local and municial can be regulated only by the city (once the city has acted), would create a highly inflexible system and would
require the state or city to obtain a continuous stream of
rulings from this Court as to whether a subject is local or
state-wide. This kind of 'straight-jacket' rule is inappropriate to the changing society in which we live and [the Merris case] should not be construed as so holding8
This statesmanlike point of view brings Colorado more in line
with the majority of states, which recognize that municialities may
possess concurrent power with the state to punish harmful conduct
which is of both state-wide and local concern, so long as the city
ordinance does not conflict with the state statute. 9 Of course, one
who by a single act violates both a state statue and a local ordinance
should not be tried twice for the same conduct-once by the state
and once by the municipality. But this sort of unfairness can be
prevented by recognizing that the municipality is not, for double
jeopardy purposes, an entity separate from its creator the state. 10
Another 1959 constitutional problem of criminal law concerned
what is sometimes called the "administrative crime": the legislature enacts a statute delegating to an administrative body power to
issue regulations dealing with a certain area of conduct, the statute
providing that whoever violates any such regulation is guilty of a
crime, punishable by a stated punishment." Although the weight
of authority permits this sort of delegation,' 2 the Colorado Supreme
Court he!d it to be unconstitutional, on the ground that only the
legislature has the power to declare what conduct is criminal. 13
6 In re Senate Bill No. 72, 339 P.2d 501 (Colo. 1959).
7 Davis v. Denver, 342 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1959), holding a Denver ordinance punishing driving after
license suspended to be void in view of the state criminal statute on the subject, but going on to say
that the state might delegate to cities police powers "in those areas where the subject matter, although
predominantly general, is also to some extent municipal." 342 P.2d at 677. In Denver v. Pike, 342
P.2d 688 (Colo. 1959), the city was held to have power to regulate speed upon the Valley Highway
within the city limits because the state (through the state highway engineer) had contracted with the
city to this effect.
A Davis v. Denver, 342 P.2d 674, 679 (Colo. 1959).
9 See Scott, One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure, 36 DICTA 34, 35 (1959).
10 See Kneier, Prosecution under State Law and Municipal Ordinance as Double Jeopardy, 16 Cornell
L.Q. 201 (1931), pointing out that, though the cases disagree, the better view is that double jeopardy
forbids prosecution by both state and city for the same conduct.
11 A variation of the administrative crime is found in statutes delegating to an administrative
agency not only power to issue regulations but power also to declare violations to be criminal and
sometimes even to fix the punishment. This type of statute is generally held unconstitutional. See
Schwenk, The Administrative Crime, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 51 (1943).
12 The leading case is United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911), upholding an indictment
charging defendant with a violation of a regulation of the Secretary of Agriculture on the use of
national forests, where Congress properly delegated power to regulate and where the statute itself
set forth the punishment for violation of regulations.
13 Casey v. People, 336 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1959), involving a state statute authorizing local boards
of health to issue health regulations and providing that violations of regulations are misdemeanors
punishable by a maximum of $1000 fine and one year confinement in county ail. The board's regulation provided that trailer court operators must be licensed. Defendant's conviction for operating a
trailer court without a license was reversed.
Olinger v. People, 344 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1959), involved a similar sort of statutory delegation to a
local soil conservation district. The statute authorized the district to promulgate a land use ordinance,
and provided that a violation of the ordinance constituted a misdemeanor, punishable by a $100 fine.
This delegation was also held to be unconstitutional.
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One case raised the issue of the scope of the protection afforded by the constitutional right of free speech to a newspaper editor
who commented editorially upon a case pending in the Colorado
Supreme Court. It was held that the newspaperman was not guilty
of criminal contempt, because his editorial-though containing unfair and false implications concerning the integrity of the justices of
the court-did not constitute an "imminent peril" to the administration of justice; the justices considered themselves
strong-minded
14
enough not to be influenced by the editorial.
In other cases, a criminal statute punishing the sale of fireworks
was upheld against the contention that the statutory definition of
fireworks was violative of due process in that it was "void for
vagueness"; 5 and the Colorado statutory test for insanity as a defense to crime (the "right and wrong" test plus the "irresistible
impulse" test) was upheld against the contention that the only test
which satisfies due process is the Durham "product" test enunciated
in the District of Columbia in 1954.16

ParticularCrimes
Embezzlement: The defendant was employed by a newspaper
to sell advertising to customers; it was not entirely clear whether
the defendant was authorized to collect the advertising fee from
the customer for transmittal to his employer. At all events, the defendant did, over a period of time, collect $3400 in cash from one
customer in this way, turning over $2400 to his employer and pocketing the other $1000. The defendant, convicted of embezzlement of
his employer's $1000, urged the Supreme Court to reverse his conviction on the ground that, although he had committed a crime, his
crime was larceny from the customer rather than embezzlement
from the newspaper. He argued that, as he was not expressly authorized to collect money from customers, he acquired only custody,
not possession, of the money which he collected; thus he could not
be guilty of embezzlement, which is limited to fraudulent conver14 In re Jameson, 340 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1959) (two dissenters believing that free speech does not
forbid punishment, as criminal contempt, of improper but unsuccessful attempts to influence courts in
pending cases). Here the editor suggested that the Supreme Court had announced the bare result of a
case before filing its written opinion as a "trial balloon" to see how it would go over with the public,
leaving itself free to later change the decision if the public should oppose it.
15 People v. Young, 339 P.2d 672 (Colo. 1959).
16 Castro v. People, 346 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1959). Although Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862,
874 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (the product test: "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the product of mental disease or mental defect"), has caused a great deal of discussion and reevaluation of insanity tests, it has not caused other jurisdictions to alter their established tests for
insanity.
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sions of another's property (including money) already in one's possession.
The court affirmed his conviction for embezzlement.17 The
Colorado statute dealing with embezzlement by employees 8 covers
an employee who either takes possession of or assumes the "care"
of another's property or money which he collects; and under the
statute it does not matter whether the ownership of the property
or money collected passes to the employer or remains in the customer. 9
Larceny: One does not commit larceny of another's property if
the possessor of the property delivers possession to him; there is no
"trespass in the taking," which larceny requires. The same rule20 applies to Colorado's special statute on larceny of an automobile.
Receiving: One case assumed

-

probably correctly

-

that the

Colorado statute on receiving stolen property covers property acquired by embezzlement
as well as property acquired by larceny,
21
robbery or burglary.
Forgery: In some states forgery (making a false instrument
with intent to defraud) and uttering (offering what is known to be
a forged instrument) are two separate crimes. Two Colorado cases
pointed out that, under the Colorado forgery statute, uttering22is not
separate from forgery; it is but one way to commit forgery.
Confidence game: In three Colorado cases the defendant obtained money from another by telling him lies in a manner involving something more tangible than spoken words; in each case the
defendant did something additional to worm his way into the confidence of his victim. Each case23 held that the evidence supported a
conviction for confidence game.
Aggravated assault: One case pointed out that, for assault with
intent to rape, the two elements of (1) assault and (2) an intent to
rape must coexist; and "intent to rape" requires that the defendant
intend not only to have sexual intercourse with the lady but2 4also
to use whatever force is necessary to overcome her resistance.
Parties to Crime
One Colorado case dealt with the criminal liability of 25one who
is present, aiding and abetting another to commit a crime. In this
17 Gill v. People, 339 P.2d 1000 (Colo. 1959).
18 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-16 (1953) (embezzlement, by an employee, of another's money or property which he collects "which has come into his possession or under his care").
19 The court pointed out that the list of the six elements of embezzlement contained in Phenneger
v. People, 85 Colo. 442, 454, 276 Pac. 983, 987 (1929), is not accurate so far as Colorado embezzlement
by an employee is concerned. The list there set forth says (item number 4) that the accused must
occupy the designated fiduciary relation and the property must come into his "possession" and be
held by him by virtue of his employment. This is erroneous today in that the employee need not take
into his possession; "under his core" will do.
20 Lee v. People, 138 Colo. 321, 332 P.2d 992 (1958), construing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5.10 (1953)
(larceny of a motor vehicle) to require a trespass in the "taking" as much as Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-2
(1953) (the general larceny statute).
21 Stull v. People, 344 P.2d 455 (Colo. 1959), dealing with Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-12 (1953),
punishing the conscious reception of "anything the stealing of which is declared to be larceny." Though
one who embezzles is "deemed guilty of larceny", Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-16 (1953), perhaps strictly
speaking embezzlement is not "stealing". At all events, receiving property acquired by false pretenses
(one who obtains property by false pretenses is not "deemed guilty of larceny") seems to be no crime
in Colorado.
22 Anderson v. People, 337 P.2d 10 (Colo. 1959); Davenport v. People, 138 Colo. 291, 332 P.2d 485
(1958) (evidence of uttering supports verdict of forgery)-both cases construing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-6.1
(1953). In Little v. People, 138 Colo. 572, 335 P.2d 863 (1959), it was held forgery to write the signature of a fictitious person on a check.
23 Fischer v. People, 138 Colo. 559, 335 P.2d 871 (1959); Bledsoe v. People, 138 Colo. 490, 335
P.2d 284 (1959); Patterson v. People, 138 Colo. 368, 333 P.2d 1047 (1959).
24 Barnhisel v. People, 347 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1959) (error to refuse instruction to that effect).
25 Harris v. People, 335 P.2d 550 (Colo. 1959).
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case A and B, stealing hubcaps from X's car, were surprised by X
and X's companion, Y. A attacked X and B attacked Y. A was
charged with committing battery with a deadly weapon upon Y
(rather than upon X, his special victim). A was held guilty of aggravated battery upon Y, because by attacking X he aided and
abetted B in B's attack on Y, the two attackers having a common
purpose of frustrating detection and avoiding capture.
II.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The Information
One defendant, charged by information with embezzling various sums of money belonging to the same victim over a period of
time, urged that the information was bad because it charged one
$1000 embezzlement in one count, instead (say) of charging ten
$100 embezzlements in ten counts.2 Conversely, another defendant,
accused of stealing six calves belonging to six different owners at
the same time and plac&, complained that the information was bad
because it charged six one-calf larcenies in six counts instead of
one six-calves larceny in one count. 27 In each case the court stated
that only one crime was committed-one $1000 embezzlement pursuant to a single criminal plan in the first case; one six-calves
larceny constituting a single transaction in the second case.
Two cases dealt with the law concerning the lesser included offense, under which an information which charges a greater offense
necessarily charges also a lesser included offense. In one case a
charge of rape was held to include a charge of assault with intent
to rape.2 8 Descending the ladder still further, the court held in anof assult with intent to rape includes a
other case that a charge
29
charge of simple assault.

The Trial
Several cases involved the defendant's right to a speedy though not too speedy-trial. In one case the defendant was charged
in one 1956 information with a burglary in X county and, in another 1956 information, with another burglary in Y county. He was
tried and sentenced in 1956 to the penitentiary for the X burglary,
but was released in 1958, because the sentence was illegal. Upon
his release he was arrested in order to be tried for the Y burglary,
for which, though accused, he had never stood trial. Upon his application for habeas corpus, he was held entitled to his release; it
was too late to try him in 1958 for the burglary of which he was
accused in 1956, in view of the Colorado constitutional provision for
a speedy trial as implemented by the Colorado statutory rule requiring trial of accused persons not on bail within two terms of
court. It was held to be no excuse for delaying trial for a Colorado
burglary that the accused was incarcerated in a Colorado prison on
26 Gill v. People, 339 P.2d 1000 (Colo. 1959).
27 Gray v. People, 342 P.2d 627 (Colo. 1959) (holding that defendant was not prejudiced by being
wrongly charged with six separate larcenies, since he was sentenced as if he had committed a single
larcn ).
28 People v. Futomata, 343 P.2d 1058 (Colo. 1959), 32 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 95, giving these other
examples as dicta: assault with a deadly weapon includes simple assault; larceny includes joyriding;
murdpr includes manslaughter; battery includes assault.
29 Barnhisel v. People, 347 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1959).
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a conviction for another Colorado crime.3 0 In another case, however,
where the two-term delay was at the request of the defendant himself, the defendant was required to stand trial.3 1 In another case,
the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a continuance
32
was held, under the facts of the case, to be no abuse of discretion.
An accused who is told that he may have counsel appointed for
him if he is indigent, but who does not request counsel and proceeds
33
to plead guilty, thereby waives his right to appointed counsel.
One Colorado case makes it clear that, in guilty-plea cases, under the statute34 requiring the trial judge to hear evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the offense in order to enable him to fix
the punishment, the judge is not required to find that the evidence
is strong enough to sustain the defendant's guilt. 35 The same case
holds that the statute36 which requires the trial court to explain the
consequences of a guilty plea to an accused who has pleaded guilty
is satisfied by an explanation addressed
to the accused's counsel
37
who is standing next to the accused.
The Colorado statutory procedure in insanity cases-calling for
a special plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity" and giving the
trial judge discretion as to whether to hold one trial or two when
the defendant also pleads "not guilty"-was upheld38 when attacked
by one who received a joint trial on the two issues.
A defendant who expects to offer no evidence in his own behalf is properly denied a right to make an opening statement, since
the function of such a statement
is to give information as to what
39
a party expects to prove.

In an important case the defendant, of Spanish-American descent, charged with robbery, moved to quash the jury panel because
of systematic exclusion of Spanish-American persons from the
panel. It was shown that, though the county in question had a substantial Spanish-American population, many members of which
were qualified for jury service, no person with a Spanish-American
name had served on a jury for the past eight years. Though the
county's jury commissioners denied practicing any discrimination
in selecting juries, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the statistics proved discrimination, thus constituting a violation of the defendant's rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. The case was remanded for 40a new trial before a jury selected without racial discrimination.

30 Roder v. People, 138 Colo. 397, 334 P.2d 437 (1959), giving effect to Colo. Const., art. II,§ 16
(speedy trial), and to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-7-12 (1953) (one committed for crime and not admitted to
boil to be set free if not tried before the end of the second term of court, unless the delay is requested
by the defendant).
31 Gallegos v. People, 337 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1959).
32 Boca v. People, 336 P.2d 712 (Colo. 1959).
33 Little v. People, 138 Colo. 572, 335 P.2d 863 (1959).
34 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-7-8 (1953).
35 Marler v. People, 336 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1959). Little v. People, 138 Colo. 572, 335 P.2d 863 (1959),
holds that the probation officer's pre-sentence report will satisfy the requirement of evidence in
aggravation and mitigotion.
36 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-7-8 (1953).
37 Marler v. People, 336 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1959). The case also holds that counsel may enter a guilty
plea for the defendant.
38 Castro v. People, 346 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1959). The court also pointed out that the prosecution has
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is sane, when the defendant
raises the issue by his insanity plea.
39 Thompson v. People, 336 P.2d 93 (Colo. 1959).
40 Montoya v. People, 345 P.2d 1062 (Colo. 1959), following Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(195-).
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The same case held that defendant's motion for a mistrial
should have been granted when the defendant was exhibited in
its voir dire examinahandcuffs to the jury panel, assembled for
4 1
tion, when there was no need for handcuffs.

Several cases dealt with instructions to the jury. Two held that
instructions should be given on lesser included offenses if there is
some evidence to support a conviction of the lesser offense. 42 One
made it plain that an instruction which assumes the existence of
evidence not in the record must 43not be given, though it may state
the law in an impeccable fashion.
Several cases concerned alleged misconduct by district attorneys in closing arguments. One case warned against over-prosecution by the district attorney. 44 Another found his remarks (he said
something was a fact, though he had not been permitted to introduce
evidence of the fact) to be improper, but not reversible error because made in retaliation to defense remarks and because the jury
remarks
was told to disregard the improper statement. 45 Improper
46
cannot be complained of on error if not in the record.
Evidence at the Trial
A number of Colorado criminal cases naturally involved problems of evidence, 47 but since matters of evidence are treated in a
separate article, 48 they are not discussed here.
41 Ibid.
42 Barnhisel v. People, 347 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1959); People v. Futomato, 343 P.2d 1058 (Colo. 1959),
32 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 95.
43 Barnhisel v. People, note 42 supra.
44 Mills v. People, 339 P.2d 998 (Colo. 1959).
45 Burress v. People, 338 P.2d 1030 (Colo. 1959).
46 Bolden v. People, 341 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1959).
47 Castro v. People, 346 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1959) (defendant's confession to police not coerced just
because defendant not warned he need not answer questions); Stull v. People, 344 P.2d 455 (Colo.
1959) (contains some directives as to admissibility and use of evidence of similar offenses); People v.
Futamota, 343 P.2d 1058 (Colo. 1959) (trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying crossexamination of character witnesses for defendant as to rumors or reports of particular unlawful conduct by defendant); Gill v. People, 339 P.2d 1000 (Colo. 1959) (evidence of defendant's bad character
inadmissible); Mills v. People, 339 P.2d 998 (Colo. 1959) (reversible error to admit prosecution's
evidence that defendant refused to take lie detector test); Brooke v. People, 339 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1959)
(paraffin test, to show whether person recently fired a gun, is scientifically unreliable; hence reversible
error to admit prosecution's evidence that defndant refused to take the test); Trujillo v. People, 338
P.2d 102 (Colo. 1959) (use of deposition of witness unavailable at trial); Lowry v. People, 337 P.2d
599 (Colo. 1959) (use of former testimony to impeach own witness); Baca v. People, 336 P.2d 712
(Colo. 1959) (admissibility of gun found near burglar, as relevant to intent); Thompson v. People, 336
P.2d 93 (Colo. 1959) (evidence admissible against one defendant but not against co-defendants; latter
must request the evidence be limited to former); Davenport v. People, 138 Colo. 291, 332 P.2d 485
(1958) (evidence of similar offenses admissible to show modus operandi); Brown v. People, 138 Colo.
354, 332 P.2d 996 (1958) (recent unexplained possession of property taken in a burglary is evidence of
guilt of burglary).
48 See One Year Review of Evidence, p. 61 infro.
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Probation

It was held improper for a trial judge, in placing a convicted
defendant upon probation, to require, as one of the terms of probation, that the defendant furnish a bond to appear in court at stated
times and whenever his presence should be required. It was considered that probation should not hinge upon
whether or not the
49
defendant has the ability to furnish a bond.
Appellate Review
On April 1, 1955, the Colorado legislature invited the Colorado
Supreme Court to promulgate a rule placing a time limit on bringing a writ of error in criminal cases. In response to this statutory
invitation the court in June, 1956, issued the following rule, effective July 1, 1956: "A writ of error in criminal cases shall not be
brought after the expiration of six months from the rendition of the
judgment and sentence complained of." 50
The United States Supreme Court in 1956 held in Griffin v. Illinois5 1 that the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution's fourteenth amendment require states to
furnish indigent criminal defendants who wish to appeal their convictions with free transcripts of the trial record or some satisfactory
substitute. The Colorado courts have apparently been flooded with
requests from prison inmates for free transcripts. The Colorado
Supreme Court held that a defendant convicted after April 1, 1955,
who has let the six months period go by cannot obtain a writ of
error and so cannot use a free transcript. 52 The court suggested
that, as to those convicted before April 1, 1955, there is no effective
time limit on the writ of error,5 3 so that a free transcript might be
appropriate. But a later Colorado case, involving a defendant convicted in January, 1955, who asked for a free transcript in 1958,
held that the request for the transcript came too late.54 Thus it
seems clear that Griffin v. Illinois has no great retroactive application so far as Colorado convicts are concerned.
A 1958 Colorado case held that a trial judge need not order a
free transcript for an indigent convict who seeks appellate review,
if furnishing the transcript would be a "vain and useless thing." 55
Insofar as supplying a transcript may be vain and useless because
the trial court "knows" that no errors would appear in the transcript if furnished, a recent United States Supreme Court case is
relevant. That case holds that an indigent convict may not be denied his free transcript just because the trial court is convinced
that the trial was free of error and that therefore there is no ground
on which to appeal; for, since the rich can appeal their convictions
49 Logan v. People, 138 Colo. 304, 332 P.2d 897 (1958). The rule was passed pursuant to Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 39-7-27 (Supp. 1957).
50 Quoted in Johnson v. People, 344 P.2d 181 (Colo. 1959).
51 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
52 Johnson v. People, 344 P.2d 181 (Colo. 1959).
53 Though there was a pre-1955 Supreme Court rule limiting the time to one year, the court suggested that the rule was invalid in view of the fact that the legislature had not, till 1955, authorized
a rule.
54 McKenna v. Tinsley, 346 P.2d 584 (Colo. 1959) (holding in the alternative, that the question of
denial of a free transcript, if the request for the transcript was timely made, could not be raised on
habeas corpus).
55 Kirkendoll v. People, 138 Colo. 267, 331 P.2d 809 (1958), 36 DICTA 34, 44 (1959).
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even though the trial court
believes there is no error, the poor are
56
equally entitled to appeal.
Habeas Corpus after Conviction
Colorado's post-conviction remedy of habeas corpus is so limited in scope as to deny relief to convicted prisoners except in cases
where the trial court had no jurisdiction over the crime or the accused or where its sentence was beyond the limits allowed by statute.57 The Colorado courts have consistently held that habeas corpus is not an available remedy even where the defendant's federal
and state constitutional rights are violated and yet the situation is
such that the writ of error does not afford appropriate relief. This
narrow view of habeas corpus was re-emphasized in 1959. A Colorado defendant coerced by the police into pleading guilty has no
right to habeas corpus, 5 though use at trial of a coerced guilty plea,
like use of a coerced confession, violates the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution." The
writ of error is not an effective remedy because (1) the coercion
which produced the guilty plea may rontinue after trial to prevent
application for the writ of error within the six months period, and
(2) the fact of coercion does not appear on the record and so cannot be reviewed on writ of error.60 So too an indigent convict who
makes timely request for a free transcript for purposes of appellate
review, and whose request is wrongly refused, cannot secure relief
by Colorado habeas corpus, 61 though the United States Constitution
requires the state to furnish the transcript, 62 and though without the
transcript he can hardly secure an appellate review on writ of error.
(Of course, in neither case is the prisoner entitled to be released
even if he can prove his allegations of constitutional violations. If
he was actually coerced into pleading guilty, he should be ordered
held for a new arraignment and trial. If he was improperly denied
the transcript, the proper remedy is to furnish him with one.)
The narrow scope of Colorado habeas corpus would not be so
bad if there were some other Colorado remedy available to the convicted defendant whose constitutional rights have been denied and
whose remedy by writ of error is not effective to right the constitutional wrong. The possibility of filling the gap with the old writ of
error coram nobis, or with a modern remedy "in the nature of" the
writ of error coram nobis, has apparently been denied by the Colorado Supreme Court, though other states with a narrow view of
habeas corpus have taken a broader viewpoint concerning coram
nobis.6'
56 Eskridge v. Washington State Board, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); see also Trinkle v. Hand, 337 P.2d
665 (Kan. 1959).
57 See Scott, Post-Conviction Remedies in Colorado Criminal Cases, 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 249 (1959);
Scott, One Year Review of Criminal Low and Procedure, 36 DICTA 34, 44-46 (1959). Compare Roder v.
Peaple, 138 Colo. 397, 334 P.2d 437 (1959), where habeas corpus was allowed for a prisoner before
trial whose constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial had been denied.
58 Lowe v. People, 342 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1959). The case also held-and properly so-that habeas
corpus is not available to one who was improperly extradited from another state.
59 Cf. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1941) (coerced plea of guilty to federal crime; habeas
corpus available).
60 Bolden v. People, 341 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1959); Morler v. People, 336 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1959) (letters
attached to defendant's brief, from doctors stating defendant's mental state when he pleaded guilty,
cannot be considered an writ of error; then court went on to consider them anyway).
61 McKenna v. Tinsley, 346 P.2d 584 (Colo. 1959).
62 Eskridge v. Washington State Board, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
63 See Scott, note 57 supro. Also corom nobis is not available after writ of error has been issued
by the Supreme Court. Brooke v. People, 339 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1959).
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The end result of Colorado's position denying the availability
of either habeas corpus or coram nobis to Colorado convicts whose
federal constitutional rights have been denied was inevitable. In
Garton v. Tinsley6 4 the United States District Court for Colorado,
on a petition for federal habeas corpus, upset the Colorado kidnaping conviction of a Colorado state prisoner on account of the state's
denial of his federal right to counsel secured to him by the fourteenth amendment. It had taken the prisoner several years of futile floundering about in the state courts-trying both state habeas
corpus and state coram nobis-before he had exhausted all possible
state remedies, as a preliminary to applying for federal habeas
corpus.
It seems clear that Colorado should provide some effective postconviction remedy for prisoners whose constitutional rights are violated and who cannot effectively secure an appellate review of the
violation by writ of error. Perhaps the best'place to make provision
for such a remedy would be in the new Colorado Rules of Criminal
Procedure, when they are promulgated by the Colorado Supreme
Court after legislative authorization. 5
Strangely enough, although Colorado often refuses habeas corpus relief to one who deserves relief, in one 1959 case the court
granted habeas corpus relief to one who surely did not deserve itall because of a slip of the tongue of a trial judge.6 6 The whole matter seems badly out of balance.
Execution of Death Penalty
One convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death must
not be executed if, subsequent to his trial, he has become so insane
as not to be able to realize what is happening to him when the
executioner performs his lethal task. Colorado's statutory scheme
for determining this sort of subsequent insanity-a civil trial by
jury at which the doomed prisoner has the burden of proving insanity-was upheld in the last one of a series of cases concerning
the wife-murderer Leick to reach the Colorado Supreme Court.6 1
Leick was finally executed, several years after he was first convicted, in early 1960.
64 171 F.Supp. 387 (D. Colo. 1959).
65 A precedent exists in Del. R. Crim. P. 35 (1953), based upon the post-conviction remedy afforded
federal prisoners by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). See also Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 44
(1952) (motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence). The Colorado Bar Association's Committee on
Criminal Low, working under the direction of Hon. William L. Gobin, is presently preparing a draft
set of Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure. A bill authorizing the Supreme Court to issue Rules is
before the 1960 Colorado legislature.
66 In Mendez v. Tinsley, 336 P.2d 706 (Colo. 1959), after a trial and conviction upon an information
charging robbery, the trial court by mistake sentenced defendant to the penitentiary for the crime of
assault with intent to rob. Defendant later petitioned the trial court for habeas corpus (claiming that,
as he was under 21 when convicted, he should have been sentenced on the assault conviction to the
reformatory). The trial court, denying habeas corpus, corrected the sentence to read "robbery" (a
crime for which those under 21 may be sentenced to the penitentiary), but unfortunately, in so doing,
ordered that "the information . . . be set aside and held for nought." The Colorado Supreme Court,
on error to review the denial of habeas corpus, reversed and ordered petitioner's release, holding that,
by mistakenly quashing the information, the trial court thereby caused the judgment of conviction to
become void. Justice Doyle's dissent points out that, in view of all the circumstances, the trial court
was not really quashing the information; it was merely setting aside the erroneous sentence and
substituting a correct sentence.
67 Leick v. People, 345 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1959), upholding Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-6 (1953). The
court assumed, without mention, that a prisoner who loses in the trial court on the issue of subsequent
insanity can hove a Supreme Court review on writ of error. Bulger v. People, 61 Colo. 187, 156 Pac.
800 (1916), however, had held to the contrary.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By

HOMER CLARK

Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law
The cases discussed in this review were decided between January 1, 1959 and January 1, 1960 and include only those of importance. As can be seen by an inspection of the cases, this was not an
unusual year for this branch of the law. There were not many cases,
and none which announced new doctrine or startling departures
from accepted principles.
DIVORCE:

PROCEDURE

One case' construed the statute 2 which formerly provided that
the court shall enter its decree dismissing the action within fortyeight hours after the close of the trial, if it decides that the divorce
is to be denied. The contention was made in this case by the former
wife that when the court granted the divorce after the expiration
of more than forty-eight hours, this violated the statute and caused
the decree to be void for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
rejected this contention on two grounds, one that the "close of the
trial" did not occur until the court resolved the issues by its decision, and two, that in any event the statute is directory and not
mandatory, so that its violation would not affect the validity of
the divorce. The case is of diminishing importance because this
provision of the statute has been eliminated by amendment.3
DIVORCE:

PROPERTY, ALIMONY AND

SUPPORT

The Supreme Court adhered again, in three cases, to its earlier
rule 4 that the level of alimony and support payments, 5 and the
manner in which property is divided between spouses6 is largely
within the discretion of the trial court. If the trial court's orders
are supported by substantial competent evidence, they will not be
disturbed. It is surprising that so many appeals are taken in the
face of this well established principle.
The question of just when a property division should be determined in a divorce action, one which has troubled the Supreme
Court in the past, arose again in. 1959. In McCoy v. McCoy 7 the
court held that there was no jurisdiction to hear and determine
property rights after the interlocutory decree, but before the
decree became final. The reasoning was that the statute authorized such a division "when a divorce has been granted,"" and the
divorce has not been granted until the decree is final. It is to be
hoped that the new statute which abolishes the interlocutory de1 Kemper v. Kemper, 344 P.2d 449 (Colo. 1959).
2 Colo. Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 71, § 1, at 440.
3 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 37 1 8, at 224.
4 The leading Colorado case is Nunemacher v. Nunemacher, 132 Colo. 300, 287 P.2d 662 (1955).
5 Brigham v. Brigham, 346 P.2d 30' (Colo. 1959).
6 Green v. Green, 342 P.2d 659 (Colo. 1959); Drake v. Drake, 138 Colo. 388, 333 P.2d 1038 (1959).
7 336 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1959).
8 Colo. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 65, 1 7, at 182.
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cree,9 and is more specific about the timing of the property
division,1 ° will end all doubt on this matter.
Two other procedural aspects of alimony also arose in 1959. In
Doll v. Doll" it was held that orders pertaining to alimony and
support money being in personam do not survive the death of
the husband. The case contains no discussion of the matter, which
is not at all as clear as seems to have been assumed,
although there
is some earlier opinion in support of this view. 12 The other case 13
contains a dictum that accrued and unpaid installments of support
money cannot be forgiven, or in other words, that alimony or
support payments, once they accrue, cannot be modified. This
holding might be of some importance if it were attempted to enforce such payments in other states, since if the Colorado Court
cannot modify them, then courts of other states are required to
enforce them under the full faith and credit clause. 14
Three cases this year dealt with aspects of alimony and property as affected by a separation agreement. The simplest of these
held that a valid separation agreement, not induced by fraud, in
which the wife relinquished all claim to the husband's property
prevented her from contesting his will. 15 Cawley v. Cawley, 16 the
9 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 37, §§ 7,8, at 224.
10 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 37, § 6, at 223.
11 345 P.2d 723 (Colo. 1959).
12 See International Trust Co. v. Liebhordt, 111 Colo. 208, 139 P.2d 264 (1943),
in Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1406 (1955).
13 Gier v. Gier, 3 19 P.2d 677 (Colo. 1959).
14 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1; Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1909).
15 Thomas v. Eaton, 138 Colo. 512, 335 P.2d 270 (1959).
16 340 P.2d 122 (Colo. 1959).
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second of these cases, held that the trial court had no jurisdiction
to adjudicate a division of property four and one-half months after
the divorce decree became final, when the decree was silent as to
property, even though the parties had a separation agreement
which divided their property. This case also was decided under the
pre-1958 divorce statute, but in all likelihood the result would be
the same under the new statute, since the new statute requires
that the property division occur "at some reasonable time thereafter as may be set by the court at the time of the issuance of said
divorce decree.' 7 In a specially concurring opinion in the Cawley
case Mr. Justice Frantz stated that in his view the petition for a
division of property had not come within a reasonable time. A
dictum in the Cawley case stated that there might be relief on the
agreement even though the petition in the divorce action was
denied.
The third case on separate agreements, Murphy v. Murphy, 8
was an action by a wife against her husband to set aside a separation agreement by which she had released all claims to the husband's property in return for his conveyance to her of cash and
property. She alleged that she had not been adequately advised or
represented, that she had been mentally ill at the time, and that
false representations had been made to her to induce her to give
the release. The separation, agreement had been attached to a divorce decree obtained (uncontested) by the husband and incorporated therein by reference. As a defense the husband argued that
the agreement could not be attacked because its validity had been
adjudicated in the divorce action. The Supreme Court refused to
accept this argument and held that the agreement did not become
part of the decree because not set out verbatim in the decree, and
therefore it was open to attack for fraud. So far as this holding
goes it is correct, since earlier cases had established in Colorado
that incorporation by reference is not sufficient to make the agreement part of the decree. 19 The wife consequently was in the same
position as any person seeking to attack a contract for fraud. The
objection to the opinion in the Murphy case is its inarticulated
assumption that if the agreement had been incorporated and so
"merged" in the decree it would have been immune to attack for
fraud. This assumption is not supported by the authorities. 20 Attack
on a decree for fraud is not "collateral" as the Supreme Court
seemed to think, but is and has for a long time been considered a
direct attack. 21 The kinds of fraud for which a d e c r e e can be
attacked may very well include the type of which the wife was
complaining in this case, since it prevented her from litigating the
property division, and therefore was "extrinsic," in the oldfashioned sense. 22 Furthermore, under the new divorce statute it
is clear that a separation agreement may be incorporated in a
17 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 37 § 6, at 223.
4
18 138 Colo. 516, 335 P.2d 280 (1959), thoroughly anolyz-L in 32 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 97 (1959).
19 McWilliams v. McWilliams, 110 Colo. 173, 132 P.2d 96 (1942).
20 Authorities on this are collected in Clark, Separation Agreements, 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 320,
346 (1956).
21 1 Freeman, Judgments § 308 (5th ed. 1925).
22 Restatement, Judgments § 118, comment b (1942). See Jorgenson . Jorgenson, 32 Cal. 2d 13,
193 P.2d 728 (1948).
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divorce decree by reference.2 3 The Murphy case does not consider
this. Presumably the court was assuming that the new statute did
not apply. And finally, the former statute provided that no action
to attack a divorce decree could be brought after the expiration of
a year, except for lack of jurisdiction or for a fraud perpetrated on
the court, 24 giving express legislative sanction for upsetting divorce
decrees on the ground of fraud. The court in the Murphy case does
not cite this statute which has now been repealed and replaced by
an even clearer provision.25 But for all these reasons, any inference
from the Murphy opinion that a separation agreement which is
merged in the divorce decree is immune to attack for the kind of
fraud asserted in that case is quite unwarranted.
At the very end of the year the court decided Allingham v.
Allingham,2 6 holding that a California judgment for arrears of
alimony would be enforced in Colorado. The defendant husband's
chief contention was that the order of the California court allowing execution for the arrears, on which suit was brought in Colorado, was obtained without notice to him and was therefore unenforcable under Griffin v. Griffin.2 7 In an eminently clear and wellreasoned opinion, Mr. Justice Doyle disposed of this contention
by showing that the Griffin case was distinguishable. In the Griffin
case enforcement of a New York judgment for arrears of alimony
was asked, and the Supreme Court of the United States held that
since by New York law alimony was modifiable even as to accrued
installments (i.e., retroactively modifiable), due process required
an opportunity to the husband to be heard before a judgment could
be entered for the arrears. Mr. Justice Doyle cited several California authorities to prove that California decrees are not retroactively modifiable.2 Therefore the husband could not have raised
any defenses in California, and for that reason no notice to him was
necessary. The court also discussed and dealt with questions of incorporation of a separation agreement by reference, an oral agreement of modification, and a claim for attorney's fees.
PARENT AND

CHILD

The matter of child custody came before the Supreme Court

on several occasions during 1959, and the court reiterated the
established rule that the trial court's determination of custody will
be upheld when supported by substantial competent evidence, this
being a question within the trial court's sound discretion. 29 The unusual thing about this year's cases is that three of them involved a
dispute between a natural parent and a grandparent over the custody of the child, and in all three an award of custody to the grandparent was upheld. 30 This represents a sharp reversal of attitude
on the part of the Court, although of course one must always admit
23 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 37, § 6, at 223.
24 Colo. Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 71, § 6, at 442.
25 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 37, §§ 6, 9. The pertinent parts of section 6 read: "The court shall
retain iurisdiction of the action . . . far the purpose of hearing any matters . . . which it was unable
to determine at earlier hearings . . . because oF fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment."
26 12 Colo. Bar Assn. Adv. Sh. 226 (1959).
27227 U.S. 220 (1946).
28 12 Colo. Bar Assn. Adv. Sh. 226, at 228.29 (1959).
29 Harris v. Harris, 345 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1959).
30 Coulter v. Coulter, 347 P.2d 492 (Colo. 1959); Devlin v. Huffman, 339 P.2d 1008 (Colo. 1959);
Walcott v. Walcott, 336 P.2d 298 (Colo. 1959).

JANUARY-FEBRUARY

1960

DICTA

that no two custody cases involve identical facts, and therefore
stare decisis plays a limited role in such litigation. Nevertheless, in
the past in a line of cases reviewing decisions of j u v e n i I e and
county courts the Supreme Court had seemingly taken the position
that a natural parent would almost never be deprived of custody,
even after conduct which would seem to amount to abandonment
or neglect of the child. 3' If the cases decided in 1959 do show
a greater willingness to give custody to persons other than natural
parents after neglect by such parents, and a greater willingness to
approve custody arrangements made by trial courts, this is a most
encouraging development. Matters of custody are certainly difficult
for appellate courts to determine on the basis of a paper record,
without the opportunity to see the child and the contesting parties,
and therefore, a very broad latitude should be given to the trial
courts.
A question of procedure in the modification of custody decrees
was settled in Pearsonv. Pearson.'2 In that case the husband sought
a modification, but the wife had disappeared and c o u 1 d not be
served with notice of the hearing. Service was made on her former
attorneys in the divorce action, and the court held this was sufficient under the Rules of Civil Procedure,'33 citing a similar California case.' 4 The Supreme Court then went on to hold that the
trial court should not have awarded custody to the husband solely
because the wife had failed to respect the visitation provisions of
the former decree, where the husband had no facilities for taking
care of the children, and had not even sought full custody.
Four c a s e s of contributory dependency this year concerned
paternity and its proof. Three of these involved merely the admission of evidence, its weight, and 3the
form of instructions and there36
fore require no discussion here. 5 One case, Vasquez v. Esquibel,
was of importance, however. It held that Lord Mansfield's rule, 37 to

the effect that a spouse cannot testify to non-access in order to
prove a child illegitimate, is no longer to be followed in Colorado.
This holding was foreshadowed earlier by the case of Nulman v.
Cooper.3 The court f o u n d Lord Mansfield's rule outmoded and
archaic and therefore rejected it.
HUSBAND AND WIFE

The rule of the Vines39 case was reaffirmed by Morgan v. Mor-

gan4 this year, which held that in a separate maintenance action
the wife can get support, but not a share of her husband's property.
The court in that case also held that a trust set up by the husband
could not be cancelled where the trustee was not a party to
the action, and that attorney fees could not be given to the wife for
31 Diernfeld v.

People,

137 Colo. 238, 323 P.2d 628 (1958); Carrera

v. Kelley, 131 Colo. 421, 283

P.2d 162 (1955); Foxgruber v. Hansen, 128 Colo. 511, 265 P.2d 233 (1954).
32 12 Colo. Bar Assn. Adv. Sh. 221 (1959).
33 Colo. R. Cir. P. 5 (b) (1).

34 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 21 Cal. 2d 580, 134 P.2d 251 (1943).
35 Medina v. Gonzales, 347 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1959); Briano v. Rubio, 347 P.2d 497 (Colo. 1959);
Angelopoulos v. Wise, 336 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1959).
36 346 P.2d 293 (Colo. 1959).
37 The history and background of the rule are discussed in Williams, The Legal Unity of Husband
and Wife, 10 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1947).
38 120 Colo. 98, 207 P.2d 814 (1949).
39 Vines v. Vines, 137 Colo. 449, 326 P.2d 662 (1958).
40 340 P.2d 1060 (Colo. 1959).
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the payment of counsel who had represented her in a divorce action
brought by the husband in Nevada. Counsel fees in the Nevada suit
were said to be a matter for the Nevada court to determine.
The principle that a property owner in Colorado may convey
his property without the consent or knowledge of his spouse was
adhered to in Will v. Mills. 41 The court said that the mere fact

that such a conveyance deprives the surviving spouse of the
chance to inherit does not make the conveyance invalid or
fraudulent.
Finally the troublesome factual question whether a man was
acting as agent for his wife in making an assignment of a mining
lease was determined in the affirmative in Broomhall v. Edgemont
Mining Co. 4 2 on the familiar principle that the agency of one spouse

for the other may be established by somewhat less convincing evidence than would be required if the parties were not married to
each other.
41344 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1959).
42 340 P.2d 869 (Colo. 1959).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
By

EMORY L. O'CONNELL

Mr. O'Connell is an attorney practicing in the Denver area.
CRIMINAL CASES

There were in 1959 no startling decisions by our Supreme Court
affecting rules of evidence in criminal cases. There were, however,
several cases which deal with points of interest to the profession.
Evidence of Refusal to Take Test
Probably of most interest were two cases decided the same day,
dealing with evidence relating to the refusal of a defendant to submit to tests.
The court held that it was error for the trial court to permit a
witness to testify that the defendant had refused to take the socalled paraffin test, in Brooke v. People.' The test is designed to
disclose whether or not the subject of the test has fired a gun within
recent hours. The court said that the testimony in the trial court,
and certain authorities, indicate that the test is not entirely reliable.
For this reason the court concludes that the results of the test
would not have been admissible, and therefore testimony of refusal
to submit to the test was incompetent.
In Mills v. People2 the defendant refused to take a lie detector
test. The Supreme Court held that it was error on the part of the
trial court to allow testimony to the effect that the defendant had
so refused. It is not entirely clear whether the court predicated its
conclusion on a constitutional basis or on possible unreliability of
the test, though it would appear that the latter controlled.
Similar Transactions
In Bledsoe v. People3 the court rather summarily disposed of
the question of admitting evidence of other similar transactions, but
affirmed the admission of such evidence on the authority of McBride v. People4 and Munsell v. People.5 A reference to these cases
throws little light on the matter of admitting evidence of other
transactions.
In Stull v. People6 we find an extensive opinion on this problem with the following four rules delineated as guide posts:
1. The District Attorney should state the purpose for which
evidence of similar acts or transactions is offered.
2. Upon request of the party adversely affected by admission
of evidence of other acts or transactions, the trial court should at
the time of its reception direct the jury as to the only purpose for
which it may be considered. The court goes on to intimate that such
instructions should be given without request, but does not say that
failure to do so would be reversible error.
1 339
2 339
3 138
4 126
5 122
6 344

P.2d 993 (Colo. 1959).
P.2d 998 (Colo. 1959).
Colo. 490, 335 P.2d 284 (1959).
Colo. 277, 248 P.2d 725 (1952).
Colo. 420, 222 P.2d 615 (1950).
P.2d 455 (Colo. 1959).
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3. In its general instructions the trial court should instruct on
the limited purpose of such evidence.
4. Use of terms "other crimes," "other offenses," "similar offenses," and the like should be carefully avoided.
Possession of Equipment Suitable
for Commission of Act Charged
The case of Baca v. People7 goes far in approving the admission
of evidence concerning the alleged possession of a gun in connection with burglary. Defendant was found in a burglarized drug
store, hiding behind a counter. A gun found on a shelf near the dedefendant's hiding place was admitted in evidence. There was some
evidence that the proprietor had left no gun there and that none
was there when the store was closed. The court admitted some
doubts as to the propriety of admitting the gun as an exhibit because it was not conclusively shown to have been in the possession
of the defendant, but nevertheless affirmed the action of the trial
court. The court held that acquisition or possession of instruments,
tools, or other means of doing the act may be shown as signifying
the probable design to use the same in performance of the act
charged.
In Dechant v. People" it was contended that a knife should not
have been admitted in a trial on a charge of assault because there
was inconsistency in the testimony of the identifying officer. He
allegedly had previously testified differently in a hearing before a
justice of the peace. The Supreme Court quite properly held that
this was a matter of credibility and not of admissibility.
Admissibility of Confession
A confession, if voluntarily made, does not become inadmissible
in evidence because of the failure of the officers to inform the defendant that his confession might be used against him. Castro v.
People.9 Here the court said that the basic question is, was the confession voluntary? This is a question primarily for the trial court
and on review its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of
clear abuse.
Cross-Examinationof CharacterWitnesses
In People v. Futamata0 the defendant was charged with rape.
The District Attorney attemped to cross-examine character witnesses as to whether they had heard that defendant had phoned
women other than prosecutrix and used improper language. Objections were sustained by the trial court and the ruling was affirmed on writ of error. The cross examination had been objected
to as hearsay. The Supreme Court felt that although this type of
cross examination is proper, strict supervision by the trial court is
necessary, and in this case was sustained.
7 336
345
9 346
10 343

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

712 (Colo. 1959).
723 (Colo. 1959).
1020 (Colo. 1959).
1058 (Colo. 1959).
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Motions and Objections in Trial of Defendants Jointly
A warning as to trial procedure is found in Thompson v. People." An officer testified that one defendant had stated to him that
"he had just been released three days previously." Counsel representing all defendants moved generally for mistrial. The motion
was denied by the trial court. The Supreme Court said the evidence was admissible as against the one defendant only, but there
was no error in overruling a motion made on behalf of all defendants.
Use of Deposition
In Trujillo v. People the trial court admitted the deposition of
a witness who testified on the taking of the deposition that he
would be out of the city at trial time. There was no proof of nonavailability at the trial. This, said the court, was error, but in view
of other testimony, not prejudicial.
12

CIVIL CASES

In the field of civil law, appellate rulings on evidence were not
revolutionary, but some cases are of interest and some may deserve
re-examination.
Experiments
There were two decisions on this question that make one wonder where the line may be drawn.
In Kling v. City and County of Denver"s the plaintiff claimed
that damages sustained in an automobile accident were the result
of the unsafe and dangerous condition of a city street. A patrolman
was permitted to testify that three or four days after the accident
he drove his car over the same street at a comparable speed and
experienced "some difficulty in handling the car at the higher speed
involved." It was contended that the admission of this testimony
was error because of, among other things, the use of a different car,
a different time involved, and operation by a more experienced
driver. The court held that these variances go to weight and not admissibility of the evidence, and admission was a matter in the discretion of the trial court.
11 336 P.2d 93 (Colo. 1959).
12 338 P.2d 102 (Colo. 1959).
13 138 Colo. 567, 335 P.2d 876 (1959).
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Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank 14 opens the door still
further. There a police officer testified that he first observed the
condition of the pavement at the place of the automobile accident,
then went to a place with "similar" conditions and made a test to
determine the speed necessary to make the skid marks observed at
the scene of the accident. At the trial, he gave precise testimony
as to the speed of the car in question immediately preceding the
accident.
The appellate court said such evidence is admissible if made
under conditions substantially similar to those which obtained on
the occurrence of the event. Here again the court said admission
was a matter of discretion with the trial court, and its exercise
would not be disturbed in the absence of abuse.
Hearsay
In Michael v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co.' the trial court admitted a report of an army officer in Alaska who had served as investigating officer in attempting to determine the cause of death
of a fellow officer. The report contained conclusions and findings
of the investigating officer, together with affidavits considered at
the army hearing into the cause of death. The Supreme Court said
the admission of the entire report was clearly error, both under the
common law as to hearsay and under the federal statute. 16 Here
again, as in Trujillo v. People,' 7 the court ruled that in view of other evidence the admission of the report was not reversible error.
In American Medical and Dental Ass'n v. Brown 8 plaintiff in
error had been sued for services rendered by a doctor. She claimed
payment and delivery of a receipt, but could not produce the receipt. After an adverse judgment, a receipt was found, and the instant case was brought to recover the previous payment. The plaintiff (former defendant) could not identify the doctor's signature on
the receipt and did not see him sign. The reviewing court held that
her positive testimony that she had paid the doctor his claim in full
and that he had handed her a receipt was sufficient to justify admission of the document.
In Askins v. Easterling9 the surviving husband claimed that
his deceased wife had wrongfully put title to certain property in
joint tenancy with her son. The property allegedly had been purchased by the wife under an agreement to take jointly with the
husband. The trial court permitted testimony (a) of third persons
as to declarations of decedent to the effect that the property had
been purchased as a home for her husband and herself; (b) of a
real estate broker who handled the purchase of the property, to the
effect the husband had signed a purchase money note, which note
was not in evidence; and (c) conversations between the husband
and the wife at the time of the purchase.
The Supreme Court held there was no error. As to (a), statements of a former owner which were made at the time he held the
property, and which were in derogation of his interest, are admissi14
15
16
17
18
19

338 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1959).
138 Colo. 450, 334 P.2d 1090 (1959).
28 U.S.C. § 1733 (1958).
338 P.2d 102 (Colo. 1959).
344 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1959).
347 P.2d 126 (Colo. 1959).
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ble against a successor in interest; as to (b), the testimony was not
prejudicial, since it was merely cumulative. As to (c), the testimony was admitted by the trial court as a declaration against the
pecuniary interest of the decedent. The Supreme Court held that
it might be treated as a verbal act introduced for the purpose of
evidencing, not the truth of the content of the statement, but rather
showing that a declaration was in fact made. However, it is obvious,
from a reading of the cited sections of Wigmore,2 0 that the court
intended to justify its admission as an "utterance forming a part
of the issue," rather than a "verbal act." It was competent to establish the contract relied on by the husband, which gave rise to a constructive trust.
Opinion Evidence
Our Supreme Court reversed the trial court in the case of Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rS2 1 because the trial court had rejected the testimony of an expert witness. The witness qualified as
an expert in design and construction engineering. The plaintiff,
Board of County Commissioners, had sued a truck company for
damage to a county bridge. It was proposed that the engineer testify as to the value of the bridge, based upon an examination of records of the county concerning its history and various repairs, including a record of materials used over the years. There was no indication that he had examined the bridge itself.
A minister was held competent to testify as to the value of
meals in Young v. Burke.22 He qualified by stating that he had observed preparation of some of the meals and had noted the quality
and quantity of the food. The court seems to say that a non-expert
may testify as to common, ordinary things within the knowledge of
the average layman, citing Wigmore on Evidence: "The general
tendency of courts, however, is toward a broad principle that no
special training
or occupation is necessary to enable one to estimate
23
values."

An expert witness may testify as to an ultimate conclusion
which the jury is required to determine.2 4 An officer was allowed
to testify that in his opinion the accident in question was caused by
20 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1770 (3d ed. 1940).
21 336 P.2d 300 (Colo. 1959).
22 338 P.2d 284 (Colo. 1959).
23 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 712 (3d ed. 1940).
24 Bridges v. Lintz, 346 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1959).
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excessive speed. This the court held did not improperly invade the
province of the jury, but that the true test of admissibility is first,
whether the subject is sufficiently complex as to be susceptible of
opinion evidence, and second, whether the witness is properly
qualified to give an opinion.
Unacknowledged Deed
It is error to reject an offer of an unacknowledged deed which
is accompanied by an offer to prove by a witness that there was due
execution and delivery of 2the
instrument by the grantor named
5
therein. Friend v. Stan-cato.

Mental Capacity of Witness
Every person of unsound mind is not incompetent to testify as
a witness.2 6 It was held that the mere fact that an individual has
been adjudicated a mental incompetent does not disqualify him as
a witness. A witness is not debarred on the ground of mental incapacity unless proof of disqualification is clear and conclusive. The
fact of mental adjudication has a bearing as to the weight, rather
than the admissibility, of the testimony.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
The res ipsa loquitur front was comparatively quiet in 1959,
after its extensive treatment last year in Weiss v. Axler.27 The court

in Weber v. Gamble Bldg. Co. 28 held that the doctrine did not apply

to a fall sustained by plaintiff when ground gave way over a septic
tank. The evidence indicated that the tank had been installed by
defendant, but that the property had been in the possession and control of the plaintiff for five months after installation of the tank.
Miscellaneous
The so-called "Lord Mansfield" rule does not prevail in Colorado. In Vasquez v. Esquibel,29 the court held that both the mother
of an alleged illegitimate child and the mother's husband could testify as to non-access of the husband at the probable time of conception.
25
26
27
28
29

342 P.2d 643 (Colo. 1959).
Howard v. Hester, 338 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1959).
137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958).
345 P.2d 727 (Colo. 1959).
346 P.2d 293 (Colo. 1959).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF TORTS
BY KENNETH

N.

KRIPKE

Mr. Kripke is an attorney practicing in the Denver area.
1959 was another prolific year in the tort field. It was also a
rather confusing year of ups and downs for litigants and their
lawyers; a year in which the court took its tort cases most seriously,
rendering numerous, carefully-detailed and well-documented
opinions. In reflecting on these cases it seems that a few decisions
were most liberal in allowing plaintiffs' recoveries while others
seemed most restrictive.
I. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
A statute provides:
Upon its own motion on the ground of error, mistake or a change in condition, the commission . . . at any

time within two years after the date last payment becomes
due and payable or within six years from the date of accident, whichever is longer, in cases where compensation has
been paid . . . may review any award and on such review,

may make an award ending, diminishing, maintaining, or
increasing compensation previously awarded ....

No such

review shall affect such award as regards any moneys already paid.'
The Supreme Court had occasion to construe this statute in the
case of University of Denver v. Industrial Comm'n.2 This case is
a sequel to University of Denver v. Nemeth 3 wherein it was
held that one who played football for a university was covered
by workmen's compensation where his employment in other parttime work for the university was dependent upon his participation
in athletics. The instant case was spawned when Nemeth petitioned
the commission to reopen in December, 1957, on the ground that
his condition had changed. Following the first case he had been
granted a lump sum settlement in October of 1954 for his injuries
which were incurred in April of 1950. The petition to reopen thus
was filed more than six years after the date of accident and considerably more than two years from the date on which he received
his lump sum settlement. In affirming the trial court's decision
ordering the commission to reopen the claimant's case, the Supreme
Court held that it was the intention of the legislature that the claim
could be reopened within two years after the last periodic payment
would have been made had there not been a lump sum settlement.
The happy result of this case, therefore, is that a claimant does not
prejudice his position with reference to a later petition to reopen
by accepting a lump sum settlement rather than periodic payments.
Snyder v. Industrial Comm'n4 posed the question: Who is
the employer? Snyder, an unlicensed cement contractor, obtained
1 Colo. Rev. Stat.6 81-14-19 (1953).
" 138 Colo. 505, 335 P.2d 292 (1959).
3 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953).
4 138 Colo. 523, 335 P.2d 543 (1959).
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a contract for sidewalks and entered into an agreement with Dillie,
who was a licensed cement contractor, that the two would work
together, each using his employees, dividing the costs and profits.
Dillie obtained the sidewalk permit and it was he who stamped his
name on the walk as required by law. Lopez, the injured claimant,
was in the general employ of Snyder but on the day he was injured
he was receiving his orders from Dillie. The court held that Dillie
and Snyder were engaged in a joint enterprise and therefore Lopez
was an employee of both, thus holding them jointly responsible for
the injuries to Lopez. It is noted in the decision that Snyder carried
no workmen's compensation insurance but Dillie was covered.
In Industrial Comm'n v. Johnson Pontiac, Inc.5 there is evidence that the employer reported to the commission that the
claimant "strained or pulled his heart muscle when attempting to
lift a transmission into an automobile." The insurer filed a general
admission of liability and paid temporary compensation. A hearing
was subsequently held to determine the extent of permanent disability following which the insurer asked leave to withdraw its
admission. The insurer claimed that the admission was based upon
a mistake of fact on the part of the employer and that it had no
support in the record. The commission denied the motion and
entered an award for permanent disability. The district court
reversed the award and directed dismissal of the claim. The
Supreme Court reversed again, reinstating the claim, and anchored
its opinion on the following grounds: (1) The insurance company
was fully aware of the facts, and, therefore, its contention that
there was a mistake of fact had no support in the record; and (2)
there was sufficient medical evidence in the record to establish
the reasonable probability that the claimant's injury was causally
connected with his work. A doctor's report in evidence stated that
the injury "undoubtedly" occurred while the claimant was pushing
in a transmission, and that the symptoms noted by the claimant at
that time probably m a r k e d the very beginning of a coronary
occlusion. In addition, the employer's report contained an admission
against interest "having probative value the weight of which was
for the consideration of the commission." The commission having
determined the issue upon competent evidence, its conclusion is
binding upon the courts.
In Divelbiss v. Industrial Comm'nO a divided court held that
where a helper on an open hearth furnace in a steel mill was injured while showering after work but before he "punched out"
and it appeared that the claimant had worked in dense heat and
dolemite dust and that the shower was provided by the employer
but that its use was optional, the act of showering was the performance of services arising out of and in the course of employment.
The majority of the court applied the test set forth in Industrial
Comm'n v. Golden Cycle Corp.7 : " [I] t arises out of the employment
if it is connected with the nature, conditions, operations, or incidents of the employment...."
5 344 P.2d 186 (Colo. 1959).
6 344 P.2d 1084 (Colo. 1959).
7 126 Colo. 68, 246 P.2d 902, 904 (1952).
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The court expressly rejected the contrary decision in Industrial
Comm'n v. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. 8 as being out of harmony
with the modern trend. The majority of the court observed:
The fact that the employer has provided these showers
and the fact that substantially all of the employees find it
necessary to use them, constitutes persuasive evidence leading to the conclusion that the shower facilities provided are
something more than a contribution to the convenience of
the employees. The health of the employee is of interest to
the employer and the inference that the employer was not
providing for the comfort and pleasure of the employee
when it installed these extensive shower facilities is a fair
one. The employers interest was actually here served. 9
The dissent noted that the claimant was not working by the
hour but by the ton, and that showering is just a matter of personal
taste. Therefore he was not performing services for his employer
when injured; "taking a bath," the minority tells us, "had nothing
to do with tending the furnace .
"...
10
This writer is moved by the humor of Professor Larson 1
wherein he criticised the Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. case on the basis
that "perhaps
the court's ideas of personal hygiene were not very
12
exacting.'
II.

AUTOMOBILE CASES

A. Guest Statute
Hennigar v. Van Every 13 is another in a long chain of unfortunate examples of the fact-finding process to which the courts must14
resort in construing cases under the Colorado Guest Statute.
This vague and confusing statute continues to clutter judicial
literature, the courts endlessly disagreeing on whether a case falls
on this side of an imaginary line or on the other. 15 The ridiculous
cost of the guest statute in terms of time and legal brains alone is
a powerful argument for its repeal. No lawyer ever seems to be
able to predict the outcome of a guest staute case and no verdict
either way seems safe until after the Supreme Court has spoken.
Mr. Hennigar was killed while a guest in an automobile driven
by Mr. Van Every. The defendant sped down a dark and unfamiliar
road ignoring signs warning him of dangerous road conditions and
disregarding oncoming traffic. He drove across a one-lane bridge
without reducing his speed although there was a car approaching
from the opposite direction. His car struck the bridge railing, then
struck the front of an approaching truck and overturned. Undoubtedly the trial court relied on the language of Pettingell v.
Moede 16 which told us that the word "willful" in the guest statute
connotes intentional. It directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. Somehow the Supreme Court drew a fine line deciding that
8 107 Colo. 226, 110 P.2d 654 (1941).
9 344 P.2d at 1087.
10 344 P.2d at 1088.
11 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation 315 (1952).
12 344 P.2d at 1087.
13 337 P.2d 7 (Colo. 1959).
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-9-1 (1953).
15 See discussion at 35 DICTA 182 (1958).
16 129 Colo. 484, 491, 271 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1954).
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Van Every's conduct was willful because the danger was obvious
and Van Every had knowledge of it. The horrendous Pettingell case
was not mentioned in the decision.
There will be no certainty of the interpretation of the guest
statute as long as there are human beings on the court. Guest
cases will continue to be appealed wherever and whenever the
losing party has the funds to do so. It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will soon have an opportunity to attack the problem
of the constitutionality
of the statute as that problem was raised in
17
Noakes v. Gaiser.
Houghtaling v. Davis" holds that where there is a regular
weekly payment for transportation to work even though it be a
small payment, the passenger is not a guest under the meaning of
the statute and the driver is therefore responsible for injuries
resulting to the passenger from the driver's ordinary negligence.
The court further observed that since the guest statute is a matter
of affirmative defense and is in derogation of the common law,
the burden of establishing such a defense is upon the driver. It is
therefore unnecessary for the plaintiff to plead or prove that the
action lies outside the statute.
Bridges v. Lintz1" further clarifies the matter of payment for
transportation. In that case, instead of an actual money payment as
in the Houghtaling case, there was a car-pool arrangement whereby
the plaintiff and the defendant drove their own cars on alternate
days. The court held that the relationship was nevertheless an
impersonal one based upon expediency and mutual benefit and
therefore the guest statute was not applicable.
B. Expert Witnesses
In Bridges v. Lintz2 0 a police officer testified that he observed

ice on the street, that the street was designated as a detour, that it
was black top, that the car had spun around, and that he saw
thirty-five feet of side-sliding marks. Based upon these observations the officer was permitted to testify that excessive speed plus
icy conditions and loss of control of the car caused the collision
of the car with a post. The court observed that even though this
conclusion of the officer clearly invaded the province of the jury,
it was nevertheless proper since the officer was qualified by his
experience and training to judge the matter of speed. The jury
was properly instructed that it could reject or accept the officer's
opinion or could give limited weight to it. Thus the court reaffirmed
the liberal view taken in Ferguson v. Hurford2" wherein a patrolman was permitted to testify that greatly excessive speed was
evidenced by skid marks.
C. Experiment
22
The court declared in Kling v. City and County of Denver
that it is within the trial court's sound discretion to admit into
evidence testimony of a police officer's experiment in which he
17 136 Colo. 73, 77, 315 P.2d 183, 185 (Colo.
18344 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1959).
1i' 346 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1959).
20 Ibid.
21 132 Colo. 507, 290 P.2d 229 (1955).
22 138 Colo. 567, 335 P.2d 876 (1959).

1957) (dissenting opinion).
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drove over the roadway at an automobile crash scene three or four
days after the crash to determine whether the condition of the
street was reasonably safe for general vehicular traffic. The court
stated that such a test is properly to be considered in connection
with other evidence. The officer drove a police car; the vehicle
involved in the crash was sixteen years old. It was claimed the
steering mechanism had broken because of ruts in the road.
D. Imputed Negligence
Swanson v. McQuown 23 clarified a point which has been particularly troublesome. The plaintiff, a sergeant in the United
States Army, was a passenger in a military vehicle driven by a
corporal. They were on duty as military police. The plaintiff was
listening for radio calls. The corporal drove into an uncontrolled
intersection taking the right of way from the defendant who was
approaching from the right. The plaintiff brought an action for
his injuries against the driver of the other car, alleging negligence.
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant because
he had not so driven his vehicle as to lose the right of way.
Reversing the trial court and returning the case for a new trial,
the Supreme Court observed that the question of whether or not
the defendant was negligent was broader than the simple matter
of right of way; that the evidence raised a jury question as to
whether or not the defendant might have violated the ordinance
on careless driving by entering the intersection at a rate of speed
which might have been imprudent under the blind conditions
existing there.
The court held that the negligence of the corporal could not
be imputed to the plaintiff despite his higher rank, adopting with
approval the Restatement position24 that imputation of negligence
depends on whether the plaintiff himself would have been liable
to a third person for the tort. Likening the position of the sergeantplaintiff to that of a public officer, the court pointed out that a
public officer is not liable for the negligence of his subordinate
unless he cooperates in the act complained of or directs or encourages it. Since the plaintiff is not barred by the fact that the corporal took the right of way, there is an issue of fact for the jury
as to whether or not the defendant drove negligently despite the
fact that he did not lose the right of way.
23 340 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1959).
24 Restatement, Torts, § 485 (1934).
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Another extremely important case in the field of imputed
negligence is Seal v. Lemmel. 25 Seal, a coroner, procured a ride
in a sheriff's car for personal reasons. The deputy sheriff who was
driving received a radio call pertaining to a hold-up and was
instructed to proceed as an emergency. Seal knew that this meant
that he would drive at a very high rate of speed. He had an
opportunity to leave the car before the deputy began the emergency
run but said that he didn't wish to do so because he would have
to walk a mile and a half to his destination.
The car was speeding on a busy street at night with its headlights and a red light on. The driver was intermittently operating
a siren, and in addition, was flashing a white spotlight on approaching cars to determine whether the hold-up get-away car might be
among them. The deputy testified that he last sounded his siren
about three-tenths of a mile from the crash scene. The defendant
was driving in the opposite direction on the same street and made
a left turn directly in front of the deputy's car. The defendant and
an eyewitness both testified they did not hear the siren.
The court instructed the jury that any negligence of the
deputy sheriff would be imputed to the plaintiff. This was held
error by the Supreme Court which observed that there was no evidence that the plaintiff was aiding the driver, or that he was his
employer, or that he was in control of the vehicle, or that there was
a joint enterprise. Therefore, under the rule of Swanson v. McQuown,26 it was error to submit to the jury the question as to
whether or not the deputy sheriff was negligent. Such negligence
would not be imputable.
It was held that the trial court compounded its error by asking the jury to determine whether or not the plaintiff under the
facts had voluntarily assumed the risk of the collision by continuing
to ride in the sheriff's vehicle when he had an opportunity to leave
before the emergency run began. The Supreme Court observed that
there may have been a question of voluntary assumption of risk
in an action between the coroner and deputy sheriff but as between
the plaintiff coroner and the driver of the other vehicle, the plaintiff assumed no risk; therefore, the doctrine of assumption of risk
had no place in the law suit. Nor did the Supreme Court believe
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence merely
because he did not reject the opportunity for transportation to his
27
destination. In this regard the court cited Jacobsen v. McGinness
as follows: "To say that in such circumstances Jacobsen was contributorily negligent would be to say that he should not have been
on that road at that time in the morning, or better still, should have
stayed at home."
E. Head-On Collision
According to the testimony in Bird v. Richardson2 the plaintiff driver saw the defendant approaching on the wrong side of
the road at a high rate of speed some distance away. The plaintiff
25 344
26 340
27 135
28 344

P.2d 694 (Colo. 1959).
P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1959).
Colo. 357, 362, 311 P.2d 696, 699 (1957).
P.2d 957 (Colo. 1959).
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continued to drive in his own lane without reducing speed. He
said that he assumed the oncoming car would return to its proper
lane. At a point about 100 to 150 feet from the point of impact, the
defendant started a side skid whereupon the plaintiff attempted
to drive into the drainage ditch on his right to avoid a collision.
He was evidently a split second too late because his left rear fender
was struck by the left rear fender of the defendant's car. At the
close of all the evidence the plaintiff moved for a directed verdict in
his favor, which motion was denied by the court. Verdict and
judgment for the defendant resulted. In reversing the trial court,
the Supreme Court held that a directed verdict should have been
granted. The court said that it was error to submit the question of
contributory negligence to the jury under circumstances wherein
the freedom of action of the plaintiff was so limited. The driver
could not be expected, observed the court, to immediately leave
the roadway and drive into a ditch to avoid a collision which might
not occur if the opposing driver returned to his proper lane of
traffic. The plaintiff cannot be charged with negligence in failing
to anticipate that the defendant will continue to drive on the
wrong side of the road when it appears that the defendant may
return to his own lane in time. Nor does the unwise choice .of
alternatives open the plaintiff to the charge of contributory negligence. If the plaintiff turns left who knows but what the defendant
might return to his own lane? If the plaintiff continues in his own
lane so might the defendant. If the plaintiff heads for the ditch on
the right side, might not the defendant do the same? The dilemma
of the plaintiff is a direct result of the negligence of the defendant
and his decision even though wrong does not form the basis for a
charge to the jury on the question of contributory negligence.
F. Defective Brakes
In Eddy v. McAninch 29 the defendant admittedly drove
through a red light striking a car in which the plaintiff was riding
as a passenger. The defendant testified that he had owned the car
only about a week; that it was supplied with an inspection sticker
when he bought it; that he had no advance notice of the brakes
being inoperative; that as he attempted to stop for the light the
brakes failed. The investigating officer arrived at the scene minutes
after the collision, tested the brakes, and found that they were not
then operating. The service manager of the firm from which the
car was purchased said that the brakes were good when the car
was sold and that he had personally examined and tested them
the morning after the collision at which time they were operating.
A brake and wheel shop tested the brakes a few days later and
found them to be in good condition. There was testimony that a
brake failure can happen suddenly and unexpectedly by reason of
dirt becoming lodged in a valve of the master cylinder. The court
submitted the issue of the defendant's negligence to the jury and
a verdict in favor of the defendant resulted. The plaintiff claimed
that her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should
have been granted. A Colorado statute" requires that automobiles
29 347 P.2d 499 (Colo. 1959).
30 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-105 (1953).
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shall be equipped with brakes adequate to stop the car within
certain prescribed distances and that these brakes shall be maintained in good working order. The plaintiff contended that the
collision was proximately caused by the defendant's failure to
comply with that statute. The Supreme Court, however, held that
such violation as well as violation of the statute on signal lights
merely raised a rebuttable presumption and that there remained
a jury question as to whether the defendant had met the burden
of disproving his negligence. Query: Would it not be better for
the court to require the defendant to prove the presence of dirt
in the master cylinder rather than to allow him to escape on
testimony to the effect that there "might have been"?
G. Child In Street
In Cornell v. Deuser31 the three-year-old plaintiff was struck
by an automobile driven by the defendant. The defendant testified
that she did not see the plaintiff in the street before the impact.
The court instructed the jury that, ".

.

. a person driving upon the

highway is entitled in the absence of actual knowledge to the
contrary, to assume
that it is safe to proceed on said highway at
'32
a lawful speed.
Holding this instruction to be error, the court observed that
the requirement of "actual knowledge" would relieve the driver
of the necessity of using reasonable and ordinary care to observe
the presence of children in the street or to observe any other circumstance which would put him on notice that a dangerous situation was presented. The court in reversing the case and remanding
it for a new trial declared, "The motorist is bound to know that
which a reasonable
person would ascertain by the exercise of
'33
ordinary care.
H. Elderly Pedestrian
In Allison v. Trustee,34 the plaintiff, an eighty-year-old woman,
was attempting to cross U. S. Highway 24 at the western edge of
Simla when she was struck by the defendant's car. The court instructed the jury that there was neither a marked nor unmarked
crosswalk at the place where the impact occurred and that the
pertinent Colorado statutes 35 provided: "Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk
or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the
right of way to all vehicles on the roadway."
In another instruction the jury was told that violation of a
statute is negligence in and of itself.
The court refused to include in its instructions another section
of the same statuteO6 which provided in essence that notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), drivers shall use due care to
avoid colliding with pedestrians and shall exercise proper care
31
32
33
34
35
36

347 P.2d 964 (Colo. 1959).
Id. at 965.
Ibid.
344 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1959).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4.59(1) (1953).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-59(4) (1959).
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upon observing children or confused or incapacitated persons on the
road.
At the pre-trial conference the defendants had admitted the
truth of the plaintiff's allegation that the plaintiff was crossing in
in a crosswalk.
From a verdict and judgment for the defendant the plaintiff
appealed. The Supreme Court held that it was error not to tell
the jury about the degree of care required of drivers under subsection (4) and stated that the trial court erred in giving to the
jury an instruction that the plainiff was not in a crosswalk in the
face of the defendant's pre-trial stipulation.
III.

DAMAGES

In Jones v. Franklin,31 a case involving an assault and battery
by a police officer, the court held that the jury could properly consider the following elements in assessing the plaintiff's damages:
fear, anxiety, indignity, disgrace, physical injuries, nervous shock,
pain, suffering, medical expenses, and loss of earnings.
IV.

SLIP

AND

FALL

"8

King Soopers, Inc. v. Mitchell, is a milestone among slip and
fall cases. The defendant appealed from a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff arising out of a fall which occurred on the defendant's
parking lot adjoining its grocery store. In determining whether
the grocery had a duty to clear the parking lot of ice and snow, the
court was impressed with the argument that the plaintiff was
carrying a sack of groceries which he had just purchased at the
store; that this made it difficult for him to see the ground; that the
company should have been able to foresee the likelihood of injury
to a shopper who must carry packages across the lot to his car. The
court held that the issues of negligence and contributory negligence
were properly submitted to the jury.
37 340 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1959).
38 342 P.2d 1006 (Colo. 1959).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
By WILLIAM P. CANTWELL

Member of the Denver firm of Holland & Hart
Etching in of certain fiduciary obligations in various aspects of
estate administration highlighted the 1959 case law developments
in the wills, estates and trusts field.
Canaday v. Kauffman1 involved the conduct of an intestate administration by the decedent's widow. This case presented an
interesting analysis of various fiduciary obligations, and resulted
in a complete affirmance of the holdings below. Among the issues
raised were the fee awarded the administratrix, her failure to pay
rent on estate realty occupied by her, her failure to comply with
statutory requirements on the filing of reports, her failure to invest
liquid funds, and her reimbursement of herself for funds she used to
repay a loan made to the estate to operate a farm. A number of
minor issues were also raised. The trial court held in favor of the administratrix on all of the issues. Affirmance by the Supreme Court
might appear to establish certain dangerous precedents. However,
it should be noted that the court carefully indicated that no loss of
any substance had occurred; and that, in some of the situations,
even though more experienced fiduciaries might have been expected
to administer the estate differently, that it would not differ with a
trial court which was satisfied with this particular administration
after careful inquiry into the circumstances. Because of this, the
case would appear to be best treated as limited to its own facts, and
not as granting a broad charter to fiduciaries in other estates.
The conclusion suggested concerning the Canaday case is buttressed by In re Estate of Jefferson2 which affirmed the county
court's removal of an administrator. The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether the administrator's acts were merely dilatory,
and therefore insufficient as grounds for removal, or whether there
was more than this, amounting to what the county court described
as ". . . general confusion and mismanagement of the estate." The
Supreme Court affirmed the county court, although it altered its
original opinion 3 somewhat on rehearing. The acts of the removed
fiduciary in Jefferson involved late filing of the inventory, failure
to file reports until ordered to do so by the court, sale of realty
without court authority, and ". . . a general lack of regard by
the fiduciary of the orderly procedure in handling estate running
completely through his administration . . ." Perhaps a signpost as
to the difference between Canaday and Jefferson is suggested in the
portion of the county court's opinion, cited by the Supreme Court,
which points out that: "The Administrator has shown a total disregard for the procedures required of a fiduciary, and this in spite
of the 'fact
that he is an attorney at law and is familiar with such
duties."4
1
2
3
4

342 P.2d
344 P.2d
11 Colo.
344 P.2d

1027 (Colo. 1959).
179 (Colo. 1959).
Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 530 (1959)at 180. (Emphasis supplied).

JANUARY-FEBRUARY

1960

DICTA

Clarification of the obligation to notify persons whose substantial rights may be adversely affected, even in proceedings subsequent to probate, is offered in Michels v. Clemens.5 Decedent
created a legal life estate in his wife, with the remainder to his
children, but attached a condition to the remainder in favor of the
plaintiff-in-error. On the death of the life tenant, defendant-inerror instituted final settlement proceedings without notice to
plaintiff-in-error, and caused a decree to be entered under which
she became vested with the entire residue. The decree recited
plaintiff-in-error's failure to perform the conditions, even though
they had in fact been performed. It was held that statutory requirements for service of process in probate matters6 contemplated
affirmative notice to this plaintiff-in-error and that failure to give
such notice was so flagrant a violation of due process that it
rendered the decree subject to direct or collateral attack and
without effect as res judicata.
The attempt of an executor to recover assets withdrawn from
a joint bank account shortly before the death of one of the joint
tenants failed in Dickson v. Snyder.7 The executor urged that the
joint tenancy was created to pass the money in violation of the
statute of wills, but neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court
found any foundation for such a theory, and instead determined
that a valid gift inter vivos had been involved.
An interesting construction problem was presented in State
v. Rogers.8 Decedent created a life interest in a testamentary trust
for a daughter with remainder to her children and more remote
issue, or, alternatively, to her brothers or their issue. The life tenant
left no issue, but did leave a will disposing of her assets, including
her reversion in the trust. Both brothers predeceased their sister,
leaving no issue surviving them. The testamentary trustee paid
assets to the escheat fund of Colorado, and it claimed no interest
in those it received, nor in a mining claim that remained in the
name of the trustee. Conflicting claims were presented by a greatniece of the decedent who asserted she was his sole heir, and by the
takers under the life tenant's will. The initial question was the date
of determination of heirs of a partially testate decedent in the
absence of an affirmative intent appearing in the will. The Supreme
Court followed the weight of authority and held that decedent's
death was the controlling date in such cases, and determined that
no affirmative contrary intent appeared. It then proceeded to determine that the decedent died intestate as to the remainder which
thereby fell to his heirs determined as of the date of his death. This
meant, under the fact situation, that the life tenant could actually
pass the property under her will since at her death she was the
sole heir of the class composing decedent's heirs living at his death.
Attorneys seeking fees for services which "benefit" an estate
are offered further documentation of the principles involved by In
re Coors Estate.9 Coors held that attorneys representing a party
unsuccessfully urging probate of ink and pencil notations and dele5342 P.2d 693 (Colo. 1959). 3
6Colo. Rev. Stat. §152-1-11( )(€)(1953).
7 340 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1959).
8 344 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1959).
9 344 P.2d 184 (Colo. 1959).
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tions on a will were not conferring benefit on the estate, but only
on their own client. In view of this, the trial court's denial of the
petition for fees was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
In other developments, a series of cases further documented
existing precedents and rulings. For example, Robinson v. Tubbs' °
involved the settled" principle that a life tenant's interest is subject
to the burdens of liens, taxes and encumbrances in the absence of
an express contrary intent. Igo v. Marshall12 likewise dealt with
settled law in the undue influence field and found the Supreme
Court again indicating that any presumption arising out of a confidential relationship may be overcome by evidence. The cy pres
doctrine received application in National Ass'n of Cerebral Palsy,
Inc. v. United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n"' in a classic case involving a
determination that an active alternative beneficiary was better
qualified to carry out the testatrix' intent than was the defunct
named beneficiary.

The Scott 14 and Restatement 15 rule on con-

structive trusts in situations involving wrongful acquisition of
title to realty by one party with the funds of another was followed
6
in Askins v. Easterling.1
Similarly, the Restatement 17 was relied
on in Gruenwald v. Mason" to hold that no constructive trust
arises from a presumed transfer of realty on an oral trust in the
absence of a memorandum, a confidential relationship or a security
motive.
Finally, a valid separation and property settlement agreement
was held effective to bar a contest by the surviving spouse in
Thomas v. Eaton 9 after it was determined that the widow's allegations were not sustainable on the facts.
10 344 P.2d 1080 (Colo. 1959).
11 Cf. Dormer v. Walker, 101 Colo. 20, 69 P.2d 1049 (1937).
12 345 P.2d 724 (Colo. 1959).
13 346 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1959).
14 4 Scott, Trusts, § 462 (2d ed. 1956).
15 Restatement, Restitution § 160 (1937).
16 347 P.2d 126 (Colo. 1959).
17 Restatement, Trusts § 44 (1) (1935).
18 335 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1959).
19 138 Colo. 512, 335 P.2d 270 (1959).
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NO ONE REALLY DIES WHO GIVES HIS EYES
The title above is taken from a pamphlet distributed by the
Colorado Society for the Prevention of Blindness. The Society is an
organization which, among other things, operates "eye banks" clearing houses for corneas and human vitreous, donated by a person at his death so that a living person may have his sight restored.
The society has had many calls from attorneys inquiring as to
the procedure in donating eyes to the eye bank. This notice is designed to answer some of the common questions asked.
A clause in a will leaving eyes to an eye bank, without more, is
useless. Eyes must be removed as soon after death as possible, at
least within five to eight hours. They must be used within fortyeight hours in the recipient. Obviously, then, waiting for probate
would take much too long.
However, arrangements can be made now to
eyes will be used at the time of death. The donor
kin simply sign a form prepared by the Colorado
Prevention of Blindness. Next of kin can also sign
of the donor, if it is done in time.

assure that the
and his next of
Society for the
after the death

Cause of death has little significance with regard to the usefulness of corneal tissue. Nor does the fact that the donor wore glasses
affect the usefulness of the cornea.
Of possible interest to the next of kin is the fact that there is
no disfigurement after removal of the donated eyes.
The proper course for the lawyer to pursue when a client expresses interest in donating his eyes is to give the client the above
facts and advise him to contact the Colorado Society for the Prevention of Blindness, 4200 E. 9th Avenue, Denver 20, Colorado. Mrs.
Marvis Quam, executive secretary of the Society, will supply sample forms for donating eyes, however, the actual form to be filled
out by a donor must go through the office of the Society.
The attorney advised of these facts may be able to help his
client and the blind may see.

BANKERS UNION LIFE SUITE
Cherry Creek, 2nd and Josephine. 2 new offices for attor-

neys or other professionals. Parking. Must share secretarial
expense. DU 8-5694.
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